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Introduction and Summary 
 
This PhD thesis presents five essays on bounded rationality and strategic interaction. The 
common theme of the five papers is that real people, i.e. people with limited ability to 
compute and reason, do not behave like game theorists suggest in some strategic situations. 
The thesis presents investigations into the extent and the determinants of deviations from 
standard game-theoretic predictions in controlled experiments and provides potential 
explanations for these deviations by referring to notions of bounded rationality.  
The specific questions addressed in the essays cover a broad range from how 
education relates to strategic uncertainty and bounded rationality, how increasing the number 
of options available for players affects behavior, and how incentives induced by the strategic 
properties – i.e. how the action of other players affect your optimal decision – shape 
decisions. In the essays, I also study how disequilibrium and failure to coordinate actions can 
be induced by irrelevant information, so-called sunspots, and how it can be mitigated by 
collective action.  
All essays in this thesis use experimental methods to investigate the multi-
faceted role of bounded rationality in strategic interaction. The experiments are guided and 
aided by theoretical considerations, and the data used has been collected in the laboratory, in 
the field (over the internet) and is in places complemented by registry data collected by the 
Danish Bureau of Statistics. The main advantage of the experimental method is its unrivalled 
ability to control other factors. This is a key requirement in studying bounded rationality 
because behavior that looks as if it was boundedly rational can often be “rationalized” or 
explained away by invoking auxiliary assumptions when the data generating process is not 
known – as is often the case with field data. 
The thesis studies the relevance of bounded rationality in strategic interaction, 
i.e. situations in which what is optimal to do for one player depends on what other players do. 
The assumption routinely made in standard game-theoretic reasoning is that players are 
unboundedly rational, and consists of two components (Camerer and Fehr, Science 2006: p. 
47). “First, individuals are assumed to form, on average, correct beliefs about events in their 
environment and about other people’s behavior; second, given their beliefs, individuals 
choose those actions that best satisfy their preferences. If individuals exhibit, however, 
systematically biased beliefs about external events or other people’s behavior or if they 
systematically deviate from the action that best satisfies their preferences, we speak of 
bounded rationality.” The second aspect is particularly relevant for the five essays discussed 
here because it highlights the importance of expectations about the behavior of other, 
possibly boundedly rational, players.  
The first three essays are closely related since the data was collected in the same 
experiment using variations of the “guessing game”. A total of 19,196 subjects participated in 
these guessing games over the internet. The experiment had two periods. In the first period, 
all participants played a standard guessing game in which all participants choose a number 
between 0 and 100. The player being closest to 2/3 of the average number chosen by all 
players wins a prize of DKK 5,000. Game theory predicts that all players pick 0, which is the 
unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game. Yet, observed behavior is grossly 
consistently with this prediction. Only about 2 percent of the players behave according to this 
prediction, and most players choose numbers around 30. In the second period, participants of 
the first period were reinvited. In total, 7,635 subjects accepted the invitation and were 
randomly allocated to one of five treatments which were variations over the guessing game in 
the first period. The first treatment was simply a repetition of the first period, serving to test 
convergence to equilibrium with repetition and learning. The second treatment transformed 
the game into an individual optimization problem in which strategic uncertainty is totally 
absent, and it therefore is a dominant strategy to choose 0. The purpose of this treatment is to 
test for the role of strategic uncertainty by eliminating it in a controlled manner. In the third 
treatment, rather than allowing for guesses between 0 and 100, guesses from 0 to 180 could 
be submitted. The purpose of this extension was on the one hand to provide a control for 
treatments 4 and 5, but also to test for how participants respond to a change in the 
environment that ought to be irrelevant according to standard theory. Treatments four and 
five serve to investigate how incentives arising from the strategic environment of the game 
shape behavior. In treatment four, the game exhibits strategic complementarity (inducing an 
incentive to “follow the crowd”) and in treatment five the game exhibits strategic 
substitutability (inducing “contrarian” behavior, i.e. incentives to choose a “high” number 
when others choose “low” numbers). 
The first paper entitled Making an Educated Guess (joint work with Jean-
Robert Tyran) explores the role of education on strategic thinking in the guessing game. In 
addition to using the data from the first period of the experiment, this paper compares the first 
two treatments. Subjects taking part in these treatments were matched with Danish registry 
data to obtain detailed individual level socio-economic variables. The experiment is the 
largest guessing game ever performed, with one out of every 280 Danes participating. It is the 
first paper to match large-scale experimental data with detailed registry data, and the paper is 
methodologically innovative in that it developed routines for running multi-period large-scale 
experiments. A main result of the paper is that “the educated”, i.e. people with high school 
education and better grades in high school and tertiary education perform better in the 
guessing game. Specifically, we show that the educated are more able players in the first 
round since their choices are closer to the target number. Interestingly, we show that “the 
educated” are also more likely to solve the individual optimization task correctly. Thus, 
education is favorable for both cognitive – solving an individual optimization task – and 
social – predicting others’ behavior – skills in a strategic game.  
The second paper entitled Step-level Thinking and Changes in the Action Set 
(singleauthored) exploits the data from the first and third treatment. The only difference 
between these two treatments is the range of possible guesses, i.e. the action set. In one 
treatment, the highest possible guess was 100 while it was 180 in the other treatment. 
Although not predicted by any theory, we find very different behavior in the two treatments. 
Interestingly, we can explain the behavior if we normalize the guesses proportional to the 
action set. With appropriate adaptations, the well-known step-level theory is consistent with 
the observed behavior.  
The third paper entitled Strategic Properties in Guessing Games (single-
authored) has two purposes. First, I introduce a new general formulation of the guessing 
game, prove existence of equilibrium, and provide the conditions for its uniqueness. Second, 
the paper investigates the causal effect of the strategic environment on guesses through 
controlled ceteris paribus variation. Treatments exclusively differ by whether actions are 
strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The strategic environment is defined by the 
slope of the best reply function – if it is optimal for an agent to choose a low guess when 
others also choose low, we say that actions are strategic complements (positive slope). If, on 
the other hand, it is optimal for an agent to choose a high guess when others guess low, we 
say that actions are strategic substitutes (negative slope). After subjects play the first round of 
the guessing game, they are randomly assigned to the two treatments. We find that subjects 
under strategic substitutes guess higher and closer to the equilibrium value than under 
strategic complements. The results suggest that strategic substitutes induces subjects reason 
more thoroughly (have more advanced depth of reasoning) than strategic complements. The 
intuition behind the results is straightforward – under strategic complements it is optimal to 
partly imitate others whereas it is optimal to act opposite of others under strategic substitutes. 
Assuming that the first period guessing game anchored subjects on low values, the intuition 
provides an explanation of the observed difference in behavior and depths of reasoning.  
Whereas the first three papers are based on a large-scale internet experiment, 
the fourth and fifth paper report results from coordination games run in a standard laboratory 
environment.  
The fourth paper entitled Collective Action and Coordination (joint with Jean-
Robert Tyran) presents two studies on the effectiveness of collective action in improving 
coordination in games with multiple, pareto-ranked equilibria. The first study shows that 
majority voting does not select a pareto-dominant equilibrium, does not prevent lock-in in a 
inferior equilibrium, and that, once coordination failed, it does not break lock-in despite the 
possibility to collectively “jump out of the trap”. The second study uses a setting in which 
coordination failure again looms large in decentralized play, but collective action per se is 
quite effective in improving coordination. Yet, we show that collective action has a limited 
coordinating effect by “setting a precedent”, i.e. in providing assurance by coordinating 
expectations on a superior equilibrium in subsequent decentralized play.  
The fifth paper entitled Coordination Failure Caused by Sunspots (joint with 
Julie Beugnot, Zeynep Gürgüç and Michael W.M. Roos) also studies coordination failure. 
While most research on coordination games investigate which mechanisms that can prevent 
coordination failure, the fifth paper asks how coordination failure can arise. Specifically, we 
ask if coordination failure can be caused by “sunspots” – i.e. a random exogenous signal, not 
related to the payoffs. In a game with pareto-ranked equilibria – that absent of sunspots is 
characterized by full coordination on the pareto superior equilibrium – we show that the 
introduction of sunspots leads to coordination failure and thus to significant inefficiency. 
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We run a large-scale two-period guessing game over the internet and match 
participants‟ choices to their socio-economic background information from registry 
data. The first period is a standard guessing game. In the second period, some 
participants simply repeat the game. Others play a version in which the game is 
transformed into an individual optimization task. Here, it is dominant to choose 0. We 
show that “the educated”, i.e. people with high school education, better grades in high 
school and tertiary education, perform better in the guessing game. Specifically, we 
show that the educated are more able players in the first period since their choices are 
closer to the target number, and are more likely to solve the individual optimization 
task. Thus, education is favorable for both cognitive – solving an individual 
optimization task – and social – predicting others‟ behavior – skills in a strategic 
game. 
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1  Introduction 
Education and training may matter for how people play games. It seems obvious 
that academic training will influence the ability to grasp strategic incentives and thus the 
ability to accurately predict how other players will behave. Yet, little is known about the 
relation. One reason is simply that most experimental studies have used students as 
participants with relatively high cognitive abilities, a high level of education and with 
little variation of these variables in the subject pool. Some studies (e.g. Güth, Schmidt, 
and Sutter 2007, Thaler 1997, Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider 2005, Bosch-Domènech 
and Nagel 1997) did use participants with lower and more varied educational 
background, but normally little is known about that background.  
We present a repeated large-scale standard guessing game (also known as a 
beauty contest) with more than 19,000 participants to shed new light on several aspects 
of education and game play. We develop and present new treatments in the perhaps 
largest controlled experiment ever performed. Furthermore, we link experimental data to 
detailed, individual socio-economic registry data on the participants to provide new 
correlates of bounded rationality. This detailed , that allow for statistical controls at an 
unprecedented level.  
Our study shows that the distribution usually observed in guessing games, 
including the prominent spikes, can be explained by assuming behaviorally 
unsophisticated players that make individual errors rather than highly sophisticated 
players with strategic uncertainty. More specifically, we refer to k-level “depth of 
reasoning” theories to account for the typical decision pattern observed in these games. 
We show that about one tenth of the players play strategically and that they guess both 
lower and closer to the target number than the non-strategic players. Furthermore we 
show that high school attendance, a higher grade point average in high school and 
tertiary education improves guessing in the game – both by overcoming individual errors 
and by better estimation of the others‟ actions. However, other socio-economic and 
personal characteristics such as income, gender, and age have no effect. Thus, attending 
high school, getting better grades in high school and completing a higher education not 
only mitigate individual errors, but also improve behavior in the first period of the 
strategic game. 
The role of cognitive ability and behavior in games has received little attention. 
Noteworthy exceptions are Frederick (2005), Benjamin, Brown and Shapiro (2006) and 
Dohmen, Falk, Huffmann and Sunde (2007), who find a correlation between cognitive 
ability and impatience and risk preferences. Millet and Dewitte (2006) study cognitive 
ability and bargaining games and show that unconditional altruistic behavior is related to 
general intelligence. In a meta-study looking at prisoners dilemma experiments, Jones 
(2007) reports that students in schools with higher SAT scores cooperate more. Rydval, 
Ortmann and Ostatnický (2007) find that subjects with lower working memory are more 
likely to make errors in reasoning. In contrast Brandstätter and Güth (2002) study 
ultimatum and dictator games and find that intelligence has no significant effect on 
bargaining behavior. 
Previous results on cognitive ability and behavior in the guessing game is scarce. 
However, the guessing game is used by Dickinson and McElroy (2009) to study the 
effect of sleep deprivation and circadian effects. They find that when players are 
deprived of sleep or when they make choices at non-optimal times-of-day, choices are 
consistent with lower levels of iterative reasoning. Yet, they fail to show whether this is 
due to strategic effects or to bounded rationality. 
Camerer (2003) performed a guessing game with Caltech undergraduates (who 
have high SAT-scores), and he found that “the fact that the Caltech students do not 
choose numbers that are much closer to the Nash equilibrium than average folks refutes 
the hypothesis that simply being good at math will automatically lead players to a Nash 
equilibrium” (p. 216).  He also finds that “unusual analytical skill and training in game 
theory move choices about one iteration closer to the equilibrium” (p. 218). These 
observations were made with homogeneous groups (Caltech students playing with 
Caltech students). Finally, Camerer concludes that when looking at heterogeneous 
groups, “samples of self-selected newspaper readers also make choices closer to 
equilibrium” (p. 218).  
Palacios-Huerta (2003) is contrasting this, when he asks subjects in a Monty Hall 
experiment to report their SAT score and Grade Point Average. He classifies students 
with higher scores as “more able”, and finds that more able subjects are more likely to 
find the optimal solution. In another paper, Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2006) perform the 
centipede game with professional chess players, and find that 69% of the players stop 
immediately (100% when only chess Grandmasters are considered), as theory suggests. 
In these two papers it seems that logical training mitigates boundedly rational behavior.  
The most closely related to ours, is Burnham, Cesarini, Wallace, Johannesson, 
and Lichtenstein (2007). These authors report results from a guessing game experiment 
performed with Swedish twins. While their study differs in a number of ways from ours, 
some of the conclusions are strikingly similar. Differences concern a slightly different 
parameterization, the game was not played over the internet (but face to face) and data 
about education, sex and age are self-reported rather than drawn from a registry. Another 
important difference is that they administer an IQ test to directly measure cognitive 
ability. They find that subjects with higher IQ and some college education tend to guess 
lower in the guessing game. In addition, they find that older subjects guess higher, 
whereas gender has no significant effect. As such, their results on cognitive ability an 
education are similar to ours. However, Burnham et al. (2007) focus on explaining the 
submitted guess rather than the “difference to the winning number” in their regressions. 
We argue that what counts in the strategic game is to be close to the winning number and 
simply “guessing lower” is not equivalent to “guessing better”.  
The guessing game is an ideal workhorse to study disequilibrium behavior, since 
it is very simple, has a clear theoretical prediction and risk preferences or social 
preferences do not plausibly affect choices. Many experiments in both newspapers and 
laboratories have been performed with varying group composition (both with respect to 
size, education and information). This has led to some stylized facts which are robust 
with respect to varying designs and parameter values. The experimental data has led to 
new theories developed to explain behavior in theses games. 
The guessing game has been studied extensively because of its apparent 
simplicity and the striking deviation from the standard economic prediction it reliably 
produces (see Bosch-Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra (2002) and Camerer 
(2003), for an overview). The guessing game was first suggested by Hervé Moulin 
(1986) as a textbook example of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Yet, when 
writing the textbook, Moulin was aware that the average person did not act according to 
this reasoning. Moulin came across the game in the French popular science journal La 
Recherche in the late 1970s, where it had been used as a tie-breaking question in a quiz 
of logical questions. When Moulin contacted La Recherche to see the results, he found 
the typical spike pattern that was confirmed in later research.
1
 Thus, the guessing game 
started as a newspaper experiment, and was introduced in the economic literature as an 
illustration of a iterated elimination of dominated strategies. Ironically, the guessing 
game would later become a favorite tool in experimental economics to demonstrate the 
failure of this reasoning process in practice.  
The structure of the guessing game is quite simple. N participants simultaneously 
choose any number xi (i = 1,…,N) from the closed interval l to h. The guess with the 
minimum distance to the “target number”, defined as p times the average number  
(X = N 
-1
 xi), wins a prize. If several people are equidistant to the target number, the 
prize is equally shared among these people. The most common parameterization is l = 0, 
h = 100, p = 2/3 and N > 2, where standard economic theory predicts that all participants 
choose 0, the unique Nash equilibrium. For a more general description of the game and 
target function, see Øvlisen(2009a). 
Numerous guessing games have been run both in the laboratory and in 
newspapers contests (e.g. Financial Times, Spektrum der Wissenschaft and Expansión – 
see Duffy and Nagel (1997) and Bosch-Domènech et al. (2002) for an overview) but few 
have focused on the role of education. Most laboratory studies use students as subjects. 
This is a subject pool with relatively high levels of education (and cognitive ability) and 
little heterogeneity. Both the experiments performed in Financial Times and in Spektrum 
der Wissenschaft suffer from a similar limitation, since the readership of these papers is 
relatively homogenous. Few newspaper contests had heterogeneous participants, but 
those who do (e.g. Expansión) cannot say much about the role of education because 
observed game play cannot be matched to educational variables. In contrast, we have 
high quality register data and considerable variation in the sample. For example the 
average annual net income in our sample around 187,547 DKK (25,000€) with a 
standard deviation of around 114,855 DKK (15,000 €) and ranges from 0 to more than 
15 million DKK (2 million €).  
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in personal communication. 
We conduct an internet experiment with two periods. For the first period, we 
recruit 19,196 subjects through announcements in the Danish newspaper Politiken. 
Politiken is a popular, “middle of the road” newspaper, and it is known to have a diverse 
readership, and is neither a tabloid nor an elitist newspaper. We can thus expect a very 
heterogeneous group of participants to take part in the experiment. The number of 
subjects corresponds to one out of every 280 Dane participating in the standard guessing 
game in the first period. In the second period, participants of the first period are invited 
by e-mail to participate again. They are then assigned (randomly) to different treatments 
each with approximately 1,500 participants, using a web-interface. To the best of our 
knowledge, this experiment is the first internet experiment using randomized treatment 
allocation and it is the first repeated large-scale guessing game.  
Internet experiments have recently become popular, since they have many 
advantages over traditional laboratory experiments. The internet allows the researcher to 
maintain many of the virtues of the laboratory experiments (e.g. induced preferences, 
randomized matching and randomized treatment allocation). In addition, collecting a 
large number of observations is easy and it can be cheaply done. Furthermore you have a 
group of “real” people participating that will exhibit large heterogeneity in age, income, 
educational background etc. In this study, we not only perform an internet experiment 
with a heterogeneous subject pool. We also learn about their personal characteristics, 
such that we can control for e.g. educational background and income in our analysis. 
However, internet experiments have a drawback, in that some control is lost. Obviously, 
selection effects cannot be excluded – but it is not clear that they should be a larger 
problem in internet experiments than they are in standard laboratory experiments.  
For example, only subjects with access to the internet can participate. This gives 
rise to a potential selection bias, if e.g. only rich or well-educated persons have access to 
the internet. In Denmark, 89 percent of the population had at the time of the experiment, 
access to the internet – either at home, at work or both places2. Making use of the 
internet is in Denmark a daily activity and it is common among all age and income 
groups to use the internet for e-banking, shopping etc. We will later see that participants 
are very heterogeneous  with respect to e.g. income, age, and education. 
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In addition, Denmark has the advantage that all contact with the government is 
registered on an individual level in a central registry. Scientists can (subject to rules of 
anonymity) gain access to these data, that on an individual level includes a variety of 
detailed socio-economic characteristics, including grade point average (GPA) from high 
school, income variables, country of origin, and various education variables. We have 
linked our participants in the experiment with the Danish registry data, and obtain socio-
economic correlates of bounded rationality that explains disequilibrium behavior. 
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, section 3 
reports the results of the experiment, section 4 reports regression results from matching 
socio-economic data and behavior in the experiment, and section 5 concludes. 
  
2 Experiment 
Section 2.1 provides a broad description of the experiment, and section 2.2 
explains the predictions of the experiment. 
2.1 Design  
The experiment has two periods and two treatments.
3
 The first period was 
announced in the hard-copy version of the Danish daily newspaper Politiken and on its 
website. Participation was only possible through their website. Participation was not 
limited to subscribers of the newspaper, but open to all visitors at the newspapers 
website.  
All participants played the standard guessing game with l = 0, h = 100 and p = 
2/3, and could guess any real number (allowing for up to nine digits) between 0 and 100 
(both included). In total 19,196 participants took part to win the prize of DKK 5000 (at 
the time approx. $1,000 or € 670), that was split equally among the four winners that 
were closest to the target number. 
In the first period, subjects provided their guess, name, address, e-mail address, 
phone number and an optional comment. The e-mail address served as the unique 
identifier, and only one guess per e-mail was allowed. The experiment was presented to 
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 A total of five treatments were run in the second period. The other three treatments address a different 
question and are discussed in companion papers, see Øvlisen(2009a,b). 
the readers as a competition and the scientific aim of the competition was not revealed. 
However, the readers were told that the aim and the result of the exercise would be 
discussed in the paper the following week. The experiment was open to participants for 
one week. Instructions (translated from Danish) can be found in the appendix. 
In the second period, we used the e-mail address provided in the first period to 
invite all previous participants to participate again. Thus, only participants of the first 
period could participate in the second period. Each participant received a personalized e-
mail that contained a unique link. By clicking this link, they visited a personalized 
homepage and were randomly allocated to one of five different treatments, each with a 
prize of DKK 5000 (at the time approx. $1000 or € 670). In addition to a short 
description of the experiment and the instructions (see appendix), they were informed 
about their own guess, the average guess and the target number of the first period. The 
information page also included two links providing additional information (in a pop-up 
window). One link showed the distribution of guesses in the first period (similar to 
Figure 1) and the other link displayed a newspaper article about the guessing game, with 
detailed comments of how to think of the game (see Schou 2005). This description 
included an intuitive explanation of the Nash equilibrium in plain words. As can be seen 
from the appendix, the instructions of the game included a line indicating the slope of the 
best response function. Of the 19,196 invited participants, 7,635 participated in the 
second period. 
In this paper, we analyze two treatments in the second period. Treatment 
REPEAT with 1,625 participants was simply a repetition of the first period, where the 
rules and parameters were not changed.  
The other treatment, ROBOT, with 1,520 participants transformed the game into 
an individual optimization task. Subjects were informed that each subject was matched 
with a computer, and that the computer would randomly draw a number between 0 and 
100 from a uniform distribution. Whoever was closest to 2/3 of the average of the 
participant‟s and the computer‟s number would win the contest. They were told that 
among all the “pairs” in this treatment, one would be randomly drawn and it would be 
determined if the participant or the computer won the DKK 5,000.  
Chou et al. (2007) run two-person guessing games with various protocols and 
instructions and claim that the participants‟ ability to solve the optimization problem is 
not due to cognitive bias but results from the “unnatural” way the game is presented and 
explained. We agree that instructions and framing matter in this game, and we believe 
we would have found much a higher share of participants choosing 0 had the game been 
explained as, for example, “if the person choose a lower number than the computer, the 
person wins”. However, that is not our point. What we show is that people who are able 
to solve the optimization problem are better educated and, most importantly, are more 
sophisticated in the game in the first period. Thus, we chose to keep the description of 
the ROBOT game as similar as possible to the game in the first period and to REPEAT.  
In both ROBOT and REPEAT, participants submitted their guess, birth date, 
gender, and postal code.  They could also update their e-mail address and leave an 
(optional) comment. 
 2.2 Theory  
Applying standard economic game theory using successive elimination of 
dominated strategies to the guessing game with the parameters presented above, results 
in one pure strategy Nash equilibrium, namely that everyone picks 0. In equilibrium, the 
average is 0, two thirds of that is 0 and all the participants share the prize and walk away 
with a strictly positive gain. This game theoretic prediction thus holds for both the first 
period and for the REPEAT treatment. However, the N-person game exhibits strategic 
complementarity in the sense that it is optimal to choose high numbers if others are 
expected to choose high numbers. 
In ROBOT, the standard economic prediction is different. Here, there are only 
two players: the computer and the participant. Multiplying a factor less than one and the 
average of two numbers, yields a number that is closer to the smaller of the two 
numbers. Therefore, in a guessing game with 2 players, the lower number always wins. 
Choosing 0 is a weakly dominant strategy, since it is always the lower number. Thus, we 
would predict that all subjects choose 0. The subjects know that the computer picks a 
random number (with equal probability) and thus the strategy of the computer is known. 
In other words, there is no strategic uncertainty present in this treatment. So, if we 
observe that some subjects do not choose 0, we can attribute the choice to an individual 
error (i.e. bounded rationality). The ROBOT treatment is thus similar in its design to the 
two-person guessing game (Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) and Nagel and 
Grosskopf (2007, 2008)). Yet, in the two-person guessing games beliefs are not properly 
controlled for. Given some belief about the other‟s action, it can still be rational to pick a 
number greater than 0. In the computerized counterpart, where the strategy of the 
computer is explained, beliefs are eliminated and thus there is no strategic uncertainty.  
Guessing games have been much studied and different theories have been 
developed to explain the robust patterns of non-Nash behavior that is found. Nagel 
(1995) is the first to suggest a theory, directly inspired from the guessing game, and also 
Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995), Stahl (2004) and Camerer, Holt and Ho (2004) provide 
theories applicable to the guessing game. 
All these theories apply step level cognition, i.e. characterize participants into 
different categories according to their cognitive depth of reasoning. In these models, 
subjects perceive that they themselves are the most sophisticated and thus they best 
respond to their belief of the other players applying less steps than themselves.  
The classic game theoretic concept of iterative elimination of dominated 
strategies use a similar logic. By applying indefinitely many steps, the equilibrium will 
be reached. Thus, a step-1 player will do one round of elimination of dominated 
strategies (and thus choose 66.7), a step-2 player will do two rounds (and choose 44.5) 
whereas a step-infinity player will choose 0. This approach typically finds little support 
from laboratory data. 
Nagel (1995) puts forward another and yet more simple approach that has had 
great success in explaining the spikes that guessing game results provide. Here, it is 
assumed that a step-0 player in first period will randomize over the interval (i.e. on 
average choose 50). A step-1 player best respond to this, believing that everyone else is a 
step-0 player, and thus choose 33.33. A step-2 player will best respond to everyone else 
being a step-1 player and choose 22.22 and so forth. For subsequent periods, a step-0 
player is assumed to choose the average number of the previous period.  
Camerer, Holt and Ho (2004) provide a theory that is based upon the same 
principle, although players here are assumed to be more sophisticated. Rather than 
assuming that everyone else applies one step of reasoning less, they assume that 
participants choose best replies to a distribution of types having less cognitive depth than 
them. Thus, a step-2 player will best respond to a mixture of step-1 and step-0 players. 
Types are assumed to be Poisson distributed. 
Finally, Stahl (1996) suggests to augment the Nagel-type step-model with a 
learning module. The idea is that as the game is repeated, players learn more than just 
the average (and target) of prior periods. They also learn which models outperform 
others, and Stahl (1996) argues that they over time will shift to better performing rules.  
 
3 Results 
3.1 One-Shot Newspaper Guessing Games  
While our experiment is the largest newspaper guessing game, it is not the first. 
Thaler (1997) did an experiment in collaboration with Financial Times
4
, Bosch-
Domènech and Nagel (1997) with Expansión, Fehr and Renninger (2000) with Die Zeit 
and Selten and Nagel (1997) with Spektrum der Wissenschaft. Although the 
characteristics of the readership of the various newspapers differ, the three studies show 
a similar pattern (see Bosch-Domènech et al. (2002) for a survey).  
All previous studies were one-shot games while ours has two periods. Thus, our 
first period is comparable to these previous newspaper guessing game studies. Broadly 
speaking, the previous newspaper experiments show similar results to ours, shown in 
Figure 1. In the first period, we find the prominent spikes at numbers around 33, and 22 
that can be explained with steps 1 and 2 using step-level reasoning (see Nagel 1995).  
In contrast to the previous newspaper experiments, we also find a spike at 67. 
Also, our average guess of 32.41 is 30-50% higher than any of the three previous 
guessing games (with averages between 19 and 25). Furthermore, we have only around 2 
percent equilibrium choices compared to between 6 and 12 percent in the previous 
newspaper experiments. Among the 19,196 guesses, four participants split the prize of 
DKK 5000 (at the time approx. $1000 or €670) equally with a winning guess of 21.6 that 
got closest to the target number of 21.61. 
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 Due to legal restrictions the FT experiment allowed only for guesses in integers – this changes the 
game slightly, since also 1 is a Nash Equilibrium, which is also reflected in the guesses provided. 
The guessing game is easy to implement from a practical perspective, and only rarely have other 
games have been run in collaboration with newspapers (e.g. Güth et al. 2007). 
Our results differ remarkably from experiments in Financial Times and Spektrum 
der Wissenschaft. These outlets have a relatively homogenous and highly educated 
readership, and it is likely that readers know that other readers have a similar 
background. Politiken on the other hand is a popular newspaper with no particularly 
distinguished readership. We believe that it is the heterogeneous readership that makes 
education an important determinant of disequilibrium play.  
 3.2 REPEAT treatment 
Subjects who responded to our invitation to participate in period 2 were 
randomly assigned to treatments. There were 5 treatments in total. The other treatments 
are discussed in companion papers (Øvlisen 2009a,b). In REPEAT the 1,625 participants 
chose an average number of 21.662 and thus a target number of 14.441. One participant 
won the prize of DKK 5000 (at the time $ 1,000 or € 670) with a guess of 14.451. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the distributions of guesses in the first period and in 
REPEAT treatment, respectively. Comparing the two figures, we clearly find that 
subjects converge towards equilibrium as the game is repeated. We see that the entire 
distribution shifts closer to 0 – the average falls from about 32 to 21. Second we observe 
coordination of expectations – the mass around the target number about doubles, from 23 
percent to 46 percent of the choices within +/– 5 from the target number.5  
Another indication of convergence is that extreme choices are less common with 
repetition. In the first period 8.4 percent of the choices were in the weakly dominated 
interval between [66
2
/3,100], whereas only 3.6 percent of choices in REPEAT were 
within this interval. Similarly, we find fewer equilibrium choices (0) in REPEAT than in 
the first period.  
When we look for the spikes we found in the first period, we see that the spikes 
at 67 and 50 have disappeared. In the first period, we found spikes at 33 and 22 that 
corresponded to 1 and 2 steps of reasoning in the step-level theory. In REPEAT, we find 
that the 33 spike is almost gone, whereas the 22 spike is still there. Most prominent are 
two new spikes at 15 and 10 arise. Using step-level theory, and assuming step-0 players 
                                                 
5
 Similar results holds for other intervals, e.g 12 percent in the first period vs. 21 per cent in REPEAT 
of choices +/– 2 from target number 
to choose last period‟s average number, the spike at 22 corresponds to 1 step of 
reasoning, whereas the spikes at 15 and 10 correspond to 2 and 3 steps, respectively.  
 













Number of Guesses = 19196
 
 
Since no newspaper (or any large-scale) guessing game has been performed for 
multiple periods, we turn to the lab for comparison of our results. The convergence we 
observe looks very similar to convergence of similar experiments performed in the 
laboratory.  
Kocher and Sutter (2005) find that using more than 3 steps is rare and they find 
no evidence of increased depth of reasoning with repetition. In Figure A1 in the 
appendix we compare our distribution of steps to Kocher and Sutter (2005). We find that 
the distribution we obtain (with many more observations) looks strikingly similar in the 
first period, and is almost identical in the second period. Thus it seems that the results 
obtained with respect to depths of reasoning are robust.  
One could hypothesize that a participant would use the same number of steps in 
all periods (and adjusting the step-0 starting point to the average of the previous period). 
However, we see from Table A1 in the appendix that this does not seem to be the case 
overall. Only about 25 percent of the participants apply the same level of reasoning in 
both periods. We find that 72% of the players in the first period and 78% of players in 
REPEAT, use 2 or fewer steps of reasoning. A Wilcoxon Signed-Rank rejects that the 
distribution of steps are the same for subjects in both periods (p =.0000). This finding is 
similar to Stahl (1996), who also reject the hypothesis that step-players use the same 
step-k rule in every period. 













Number of Guesses = 1625
 
However, when we limit our attention only to players who are classified as level-
1 or level-2 in the first period we find that a large share of the subjects classified as 
level-1 players in the first round switch to level-2 play in the second round. We classify 
39 subjects as level-1, since they choose numbers between 32 and 34, and 27 subjects as 
level-2, since they choose numbers between 21 and 23. If these players would maintain 
the same behavioral sophistication they would again be level-1 and level-2 players. 
Level-1 play in REPEAT corresponds to choosing around 21 (assuming step-0 players 
choose the average of the first period), and level-2 play corresponds to choosing around 
14.  
















Figure 3 shows the distribution of choices in REPEAT for the 39 subjects 
classified as level-1 players in period 1.The average choice of 23.4 is close to the 
prediction of 21. However, Figure 3 shows that we do not find a spike at 21. Instead, we 
find the largest spike at 14, corresponding to level-2 play. In fact, 20.5 percent of the 
“level-1” players chose between 20 and 22 in the second period. This is also where we 
find the largest spike among all subjects (see Figure 2). Thus, it would be alarming if the 
step-1 players would exhibit a very different pattern. 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of choices for subjects who were classified as 
level-2 players in the first period. The results from looking at “level-2” players are 
inconclusive. We do indeed find a large spike at the predicted value of 21, corresponding 
to level-2 play in REPEAT. However, equally many did not adjust their guess and 
changed to level-1 play in REPEAT. Finally, a large spike at 5 remains unexplained by 
step-level thinking. We will later return to this topic, when we look at how socio-
economic variables correlate with steps of reasoning. 













3.3 ROBOT treatment 
We conclude that the typical spike-pattern found in guessing games can be 
explained using step-level theory, assuming non-sophisticated players. However, we can 
expect a small fraction of the participants to correctly solve the game, and in expectation 
of violation of rationality, they themselves best-respond to this belief and choose a 
number greater than 0. 
In ROBOT, subjects faced a much simpler game than in REPEAT since they 
knew the strategy of the computer. Thus they did not face strategic uncertainty, and the 
game was reduced to an individual optimization task, where it is a dominant strategy to 
choose 0. This is very interesting, since it controls for expectations and strategic 
uncertainty, and allows us to attribute any non-0 guesses to bounded rationality.  
Figure 5 displays the distribution of choices in the ROBOT treatment. 
Surprisingly, less than 12 percent correctly chose 0. Thus, the vast majority of subjects 
failed to optimize in this simplified setting. One could argue that since a deviation from 
0 is not very costly, we should not expect all submitted numbers to be exactly 0, but just 
expect them to be “low”. Guessing one unit higher reduces the probability of winning by 
1 percent, so we should then expect to observe a triangular shaped histogram with 
decreasing observations in guesses. We clearly do not observe such a pattern, and we 
find that guesses between 1 and 10 are rare. 












Number of Guesses = 1520
 
The structure of our game is similar to the two-person guessing game in 
Grosskopf and Nagel (2007, 2008)
 6
 where the weakly dominant strategy is 0. However, 
their design is different in a crucial way. In the two-person guessing game, the strategy 
of the opponent is not known and subjects thus still face strategic uncertainty. Any 
behavior different from 0 could be caused by disequilibrium expectations. Thus, the 
theoretic prediction rests on both the assumption of rationality and of common 
knowledge of rationality. In contrast in ROBOT, the strategy of the computer is known 
and strategic uncertainty eliminated. Here, 0 is a weakly dominant strategy, controlling 
for expectations and the theoretic prediction solely relies on the assumption of 
rationality. Despite the differences, the two-person guessing game is an interesting 
comparison for our ROBOT treatment. Grosskopf and Nagel (2007, 2008) report similar 
findings in that only about 10 percent of their student participants choose 0 when they 
play the 2-person game for the first time.
7
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 Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2004) study the relation of information search and responses in two-
person guessing games.   
7
 Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) report that 21.2% of the guesses are above 50 whereas we find only 
12.0% above 50. Grosskopf and Nagel (2008) perform different sequences of the game and find that 
behaviour in the first round of a 2-person guessing game is not different for subjects who have 
previously been exposed to a n > 2 guessing game. 
We find that about 12 percent of participants correctly optimize when they face a 
version of the guessing game without strategic uncertainty. Consequently, about 88 
percent of the subjects failed to optimize in this setting. In the following, we study these 
two groups of subjects into more detail.  
In Figure 6, we look at how the 88 percent (1,345 subjects) “non-optimizers” in 
ROBOT played the game in the first period. When comparing Figure 1 and 6, we find 
that the distribution of choices in the first period of the guessing game (with 19,196 
subjects) is the same as for non-optimizers in ROBOT. Thus, subjects who failed to 
optimize in ROBOT have a typical behavioral decision pattern in the first period. A 
Mann Whitney test fails to reject that guesses from non-optimizers in ROBOT come 
from the same distribution as all non-ROBOT subjects decisions (p = .0598). This result 
suggests that the typical outcome in the first period of the guessing game can be 
explained by non-sophisticated players exhibiting bounded rationality and not by 
sophisticated players who are subject to strategic uncertainty. We conclude that subjects 
failing to optimize in ROBOT act as the “typical participant” in a normal guessing game.  
How do optimizers in ROBOT play the normal guessing game? Figure 7 shows 
the choices of the 12 percent (175 subjects) that optimized in the simplified ROBOT in 
the standard game in the first period. When comparing to Figures 1 and 6, we clearly see 
that these subjects played totally different to the overall distribution of guesses in the 
first period and a Mann Whitney U-test clearly rejects that the two distributions are the 
same (p = .000). We do not find the typical spikes, we find only 1 percent (two 
observations) dominated choices, and we find lower numbers (average of 18 and a 
median of 17.93). 
The 12 percent can be regarded as the upper bound for the number of subjects 
that understood the game in the first period, because of two reasons. First, we know from 
Weber (2003) that subjects converge towards 0 even without feedback. Second, some 
subjects might have read about the game in the newspaper article that followed the first 
period. In fact, only 1 percent (2 observations) of the 175 optimizers chose 0 in the first 
period. In the first period, about 24 percent of their choices are +/- 5 from the winning 
number, about 45 percent are below the winning number -5 and the remaining 21 percent 
are above the winning number +5. So, although optimizers guess closer to the winning 
number than non-optimizers, it seems that they overestimate their fellow participants in 
that they tend to guess below the winning number.  












Number of Guesses = 1345
 












Number of Guesses = 175
 
4 Socio-economic correlates 
Statistics Denmark collects registry data on the Danish population. They keep 
records of all public databases, such that all data collected by any governmental agency 
(health care, tax authorities, education, transfers etc.) is stored on an individual level, 
using a common personal identifier. Under strict anonymity rules, researchers can gain 
access to this data such that individual-level analysis can be carried out.  
We have gained access to the data, and have uniquely identified about 500 
subjects per treatment, corresponding to about one third of our participants of the second 
period. We use the participants‟ zip-code, gender and birthdates to identify unique 
individuals in the Statistics Denmark database. This identification allows us to for the 
first time to match information like income, grades, education, country of origin, type of 
employment and other socio-economic variables with the experimental data.  
 
4.1 The data 
We conclude that our sample looks different from the population when it comes 
to completion of high school and gender. The other variables look similar to the 
population as a whole. We do not claim that we have a representative sample, but we do 
claim that we have high quality socio-economic data and a large heterogeneous sample 
that allows for a control for all relevant variables. We argue that the identification 
process does not bias the data, and we argue that there is not systematic attrition from 
period 1 to period 2 of the experiment. While there clearly is selection into participating 
in the experiment, we believe that the rich socio-economic data allows us to control for 
relevant variables. 
With 19,196 participants in period one, but only 7,635 participants in the second 
period (randomly assigned to 5 treatments) attrition is an obvious issue. We believe the 
following factors account for this attrition. As the second period of the experiment took 
part about a year later than the first period, some participants never received the 
invitation to participate in the second period (e.g. due to changed e-mail addresses, or 
not reading the e-mail on time). This source of attrition seems to induce no selection 
bias. Yet, one could fear that selection would be an issue in the second part of the 
experiment – e.g. only subjects close to the target in the first period would participate 
again. However, this seems not to be the case. In fact, the distribution of guesses made in 
the first period by participants in the second period (n = 7,635) is not different from the 
distribution of those who only took part in period one (n = 11,561) (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, p = .787). Figure 8 shows the striking similarity of choices of these two 
groups in period 1. We also find no difference when comparing period 1 choices of 
participants in REPEAT and ROBOT (n = 3145) (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p = .763). 
Of the total 7,635 participants
8
 in both periods, a unique match was found for 
2,599 of them. These participants are the only persons in Denmark with the exact 
combination of gender, zip code and birth-date the participant indicated. So, about one 
third of our subjects have been uniquely identified. We only include uniquely identified 
subjects in the regression analysis. 
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To test if our identification strategy causes systematic bias, we compare the 
variables obtained from the experiment for our uniquely identified sample and our full 
sample. Table 1 shows that the variables in question do not differ between the two 
samples, except for the variable age. While both the average and the standard deviation 
exhibit no large numerical difference we find that we cannot reject that  slightly older 
participants were selected into period 2.  
We find that the distributions of submitted guesses for all participants (Figure 1, 
2 and 5) and for the identified subjects (Figure A2, A3 and A4, respectively) are similar. 
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 Note that there were 5 treatments in total, of which 2 are discussed in this paper 
Thus, the key variables of interest (guesses, clicked distribution) are no different 
between the full sample and the matched sample. 
In total 7,635 subjects participated in the second period, of which 3,145 were 
randomly allocated to take part in either the ROBOT or the REPEAT treatment. The 
random allocation ensured no selection effect into treatments. Of all the participants, 
2,599 were uniquely matched participants, having 1,100 of them in either ROBOT or 
REPEAT (among these, few observations might be dropped from the regressions due to 
missing values – this will be clear from the regression tables).  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 









Guess in period 1 31.36 32.64 0.15 30.92 31.28 0.96 
Guess in period 2 28.23 26.87 0.13 21.17 22.56 0.39 
Clicked 
distribution 
0.21 0.23 0.46 0.26 0.28 0.60 
Age
1
 34.13 36.53 0.00 35.09 36.64 0.02 
Pct. male 0.72 0.71 0.80 0.71 0.71 0.89 





The variables obtained in the experiment are the guess in period 1, the guess in 
period 2, gender, age, and whether they in period 2 clicked the link to see the distribution 
of period 1. Table 1 shows that around 25 percent of the subjects clicked the distribution 
in REPEAT, whereas slightly less clicked it in ROBOT – in the latter treatment, the 
information provided by the distribution has no value, which explains why fewer 
subjects chose to acquire the information. 
The variables obtained from Statistics Denmark are type of employment 
(employed, retired, self-employed etc.), type of highest education completed, income 
(both net and gross), and grade point average (GPA) in high school. Table 2 provides 
summary statistics for the socio-economic variables used in the regression analysis. With 
an average age close to 37 and a standard deviation of 12-13 years, our participants are 
two years younger on average than the population of Denmark (average 39.2 in 2006)
9
. 
The standard deviation of the entire Danish population in 2006 was 22.95, and our 
sample has thus a smaller standard deviation. About 71 percent of participants in the 
second period are male. This is a much higher share than in the Danish population as a 
whole (49 percent). Our average income of 187,547 DKK (25,000 €) is very close to the 
average net income in Denmark of 172,754 DKK (23,000 €) in 2006. The large standard 
deviation of 114,855 DKK (15,000 €) in our sample shows that subjects in our 
experiment are rather heterogenous. About half the identified sample completed high 
school (or equivalent), which is significantly higher than the 32 percent in the Danish 
population. Table 2 shows that the random allocation to treatments was effective, since 
all relevant variables are tested similar in REPEAT and ROBOT. 
Table 2: Uniquely Identified Sample 
 ROBOT REPEAT Mann-Whitney 
Variable Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev (p-values) 
Guess in period 1 32.64 20.78 31.23 21.14 0.17 
Guess in period 2 26.87 20.00 22.56 17.21 0.00 
Clicked distribution 
(dummy) 
0.23 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.05 
Age 36.62 12.43 36.81 12.98 0.99 
Pct. male 0.71 0.45 0.71 0.45 0.95 
Net Income (DKK) 193,201 134,353 185,600 121,187 0.33 
Pct. High School 
Completion(dummy) 
0.52 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.96 
GPA 8.66 1.02 8.71 0.99 0.55 
n 524 576  
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 All country data averages come from Statistics Denmark online statistics on the Danish population: 
http://www.statistikbanken.dk. Data from year 2006. 
4.2 The Educational Variables 
In this section we will briefly describe the educational variables in our dataset. 
The grade point average (GPA) variable is available for all persons completing high 
school (or equivalent) from year 1978 onwards. Danish grades are {00, 03, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 13}, where 6 is the passing grade. A higher GPA indicates better performance in 
high school. Since the GPA is an average of all grades, it can take any value from 
[6,13]
10
. Note, that missing values of GPA can come from two sources: either the person 
did not complete high school and has thus no GPA recorded, or the person completed 
high school before 1978.
11
  
Figure 9 plots the submitted guesses in REPEAT against the GPA. The 
horizontal lines depicts the beginning of the top and bottom quartile of grades (GPA 
above 9.5 and below 8.2, respectively). The two vertical lines mark the target value (at 
14.451) and the average (at 21.662). The downward sloping line is the fitted regression 
line. With a highly statistical significant negative slope of -0.016, the regression line 
shows the negative relationship between grades and guesses without controlling for any 
additional variables. This is finding is similar to Burnham et al. (2007), who find that 
subjects in the lowest quartile of cognitive ability make higher guesses, while subjects in 
the top quartile make almost no choices above 50 and one-third make choices below 
12.5.  
We also have very detailed information of the highest completed education. A 
total of 2,318 education types are available. We use this information to create a (dummy) 
variable “tertiary education”, that takes the value one if a bachelor, a master or a PhD-
degree has been obtained. As expected, we find a significant positive correlation of 0.17 
between GPA and whether a PhD has been obtained.  
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 The GPA can take values slightly lower than the passing grade of 6, since exceptional situations can 
arise where high school will be completed even with a grade point averages below the passing grade. 
11
 Adding a dummy to control for this yield no changes in the regressions – coefficients remain similar, 
and the significance of the coefficients does not change.  
Figure 9: Grades and Guesses 
 
4.3 Regression Specifications 
In the period 1 and REPEAT we measure the success of a participant by the 
absolute difference to the winning number. We regress the absolute difference to the 
winning number using a TOBIT model with censoring at 0.  
In ROBOT, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the 
participant solved the optimization task correctly (chose 0) and the dummy is 0 
otherwise. 
Since only about half the sample has completed high school, we include a GPA 
dummy (that takes the value 1 if high school is completed) and interact this GPA dummy 
with the GPA. This allows us to use all the observations, and interpret the results both 
with respect to high school completion and grade level in high school.  
All regressions control for age, gender and income after tax and interests(in 
10,000 DKK). The regressions run on second period data (REPEAT and ROBOT) 
include two additional independent variables. The first is the difference to the target in 
period 1. This variable measures if subjects are “good” at the game and implicitly 
measures whether subjects who guessed high in the first period also guess high in the 
second period (inertia). The second is a dummy that takes the value 1 if subjects in the 
second period clicked the link to the distribution of choices in the first period.  
4.4 High School Completion  
In the following tables the regression results for the first period, REPEAT, and 
ROBOT will be presented. We will discuss this triple three times, adding an education 
variable each time, also to check for robustness of results. First, we look at only upper 
secondary education (high school, ages 15-18, about 32% of a cohort), and then we look 
at tertiary education. Finally, we add the grade point average in high school. 
We will now comment on the results of the first set of regressions, found in Table 
3. The dummy capturing high school attendance is significant and of a magnitude of 
around 3 points in the first period. Thus, having attended high school implies a guess of 
3 points closer to the winning number. In ROBOT we find, that subjects who attended 
high school are more likely to choose the dominant strategy of 0. In ROBOT, we see that 
this education variable is highly significant. We find this plausible because solving the 
optimization task is not trivial (only 12% could do it) and we know from other studies 
that cognition helps for optimization. Interestingly we find that in REPEAT the 
coefficient is insignificant. As seen from Figure 2, there is very little variation in the 
guesses provided. Hence, the regressions have less variation to pick up, and it seems 
plausible to expect less statistically significant variables in the regressions run on 
REPEAT data. 
Table 3: Regression Results –High School Completion  














 (0.04) (0.006) 




 (1.452) (0.221) 
Gender 1=Male -3.76*** -2.02 0.40* 
 
(0.700) (1.409) (0.23) 
Age Years 0.00 -0.06 -0.01 
 
(0.033) (0.063) (0.011) 
Income after tax and interests -0.83** -0.11 0.09 
Gross income yields same results  coefficients and significance  (0.324) (0.606) (0.07) 
Education, secondary (Completed High School) -3.76*** -2.09 0.60*** 
 
(0.711) (1.405) (0.223) 
Constant 23.38*** 13.39*** -1.85*** 
  (1.410) (2.872) (0.49) 
Sigma 15.93*** 14.28*** 
 Standard deviation of errors (0.222) (0.437)   
Control for type of employment: No No No 
Observations 2568 535 461 
Standard deviation in parentheses  
   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  
For the second period data, we have two additional independent variables, 
namely the difference to the winning number in the first period and whether the link to 
the distribution of guesses in the first period was clicked. For the REPEAT treatment, we 
find that both coefficients are statistically significant, and the magnitude high. The 
results imply, that for each unit a participant was away from target in the first period, she 
remained 0.28 points away from the target in REPEAT. Thus, the adaption is 
incomplete. Table A2 in the appendix shows the regression results with the difference in 
differences in the first period and REPEAT. We find that age is the only significant 
variable and thus that the degree of inertia is uncorrelated with educational variables. 
The distribution dummy yields a very large coefficient in REPEAT, implying a 
distance of 4.5 less to the winning number if the link was clicked. So, the additional 
information provided in the distribution graph helped subjects guess closer to the 
winning number. One could argue that the coefficient cannot be interpreted causally, 
since the “smart” or “interested” subjects – who guess lower and closer to the winning 
number – could be the subjects who click the link to the distribution. In ROBOT 
however, the coefficient is insignificant. Getting feedback about the distribution of 
choices in the first period does not help figuring out the solution to the optimization 
problem. ROBOT is an optimization task in which strategic considerations or experience 
should play no role. Yet, you would still expect the “smart” and “interested” subjects to 
be interested in the game and click the distribution link. Since the variable is 
insignificant in ROBOT, it suggests that we can interpret the effect causally in REPEAT. 
In the literature dealing with overconfidence, many studies find that men more 
overconfident than women (e.g. Lundeberg, Fox, and Punccohar 1994 and Barber and 
Odean 2001). Since roughly two thirds of our participants are male, systematic 
overconfidence by males might be self-fulfilling. Seen in this light, the statistically 
significant gender coefficient is interesting. In the first period, we find males guessing 
closer to the winning number. In the second period, males‟ guesses are not statistical 
significantly closer to the winning number. Thus, in the second period systematic male 
overconfidence might be self-fulfilling. However, we find very little gender effect in 
ROBOT, ruling out systematic overconfidence as an explanation for the behaviour in 
REPEAT. 
Income is only statistically significant in the first period. Income is highly 
correlated with education, and the significance of income might therefore be due to an 
omitted variable bias. However, we control for this in later regressions. 
Finally we see that the constant is much lower in REPEAT than in the first 
period, showing that there is convergence, in that subjects in REPEAT are – on average 
– much closer to target than in the first period. 
The interesting part here is that education was significant in the first period. 
However, in REPEAT education is now not significant and the two controls, gender and 
income, lose significance. In the first period, players have to form expectations “out of 
the blue”. This is cognitively difficult and good cognitive abilities are therefore helpful. 
But in REPEAT, it is more or less an issue of using the anchor provided by the average 
in the first period and applying the same reasoning (e.g. k-level) as before. This is merely 
an adaptation task that does not require much cognitive ability, yet information about the 
distribution of guesses in the previous period is helpful. Simply from looking at the 
distribution of choices in REPEAT (see Figure 2), the very condensed distribution does 
not leave much heterogeneity for the regressions to pick up.  
4.5 Tertiary Education 
Table 4 below provides the results from the next set of regressions. Similar to the 
previous table, we show the regression results for the first period, REPEAT and 
ROBOT. 
First, we see that the coefficient for tertiary education is, as high school was in 
the first set, highly significant for the first period and ROBOT guesses. We again see 
that education in the REPEAT is insignificant. As a consequence of including tertiary 
education, the effect secondary education is getting, as expected, weaker in both the first 
period and ROBOT. It is remarkable that the coefficients on the controls are very stable, 
compared to Table 3. 
4.6 Grade Point Average (GPA)  
Table 5 below reports the results from the last set of regressions. Here, grade point 
average from high school is included (interacted with a dummy for high school 
completion). 
 
Table 4: Regression Results –Tertiary Education 














 (0.04) (0.007) 




 (1.46) (0.224) 
Gender 1=Male -3.67*** -2.02 0.41* 
 
(0.696) (1.409) (0.236) 
Age Years 0.01 -0.06 -0.01 
 
(0.033) (0.063) (0.011) 
Income after tax and interests -0.43 -0.10 0.06 
Gross income yields same results  coefficients and significance  (0.331) (0.623) (0.074) 
Education, secondary (Completed High School) -2.46*** -2.05 0.42* 
 
(0.752) (1.489) (0.242) 
Education, tertiary (Completed BA, MA or PhD) -3.80*** -0.13 0.47** 
 
(0.74) (1.486) (0.208) 
Constant 22.79*** 13.37*** -1.78*** 
  (1.407) (2.874) (0.503) 
Sigma 15.85*** 14.28*** 
 Standard deviation of errors (0.221) (0.437)   
Control for type of employment: No No No 
Observations 2568 535 461 
Standard deviation in parentheses  
   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  
Table 5: Regression Results – GPA  














 (0.04) (0.007) 




 (1.475) (0.229) 
Gender 1=Male -3.70*** -2.18 0.46* 
 
(0.695) (1.401) (0.242) 
Age Years 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 
 
(0.033) (0.063) (0.011) 
Income after tax and interests -0.41 -0.10 0.04 
Gross income yields same results  coefficients and significance  (0.331) (0.619) (0.075) 
Education, secondary (Completed High 
School) 9.47** 18.49** -2.16* 
 
(3.869) (7.79) (1.197) 
Education, tertiary (Completed BA, MA or PhD) -3.14*** 0.87 0.33 
 
(0.768) (1.523) (0.221) 
High School * GPA in High School -1.42*** -2.43*** 0.30** 
 
(0.451) (0.903) (0.136) 
Constant 23.23*** 14.10*** -2.02*** 
  (1.411) (2.868) (0.518) 
Sigma 15.82*** 14.19*** 
 Standard deviation of errors (0.221) (0.434)   
Control for type of employment: No No No 
Observations 2568 535 461 
Standard deviation in parentheses  
   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
  
The inclusion of GPA changes the coefficients for secondary education 
dramatically - both in sign and size. However, when interpreting the numbers we must 
take the level of GPA into account. The average GPA in our sample 8.7, which means 
that the net effect of high school for an “average high school student” is:  
Period 1: 9.47+(8.7*-1.42)=-2.88 (close to -2.46 in Table 4) 
REPAT: 18.49+(8.7*-2.43)=-2.65 (close to -2.05, but insignificant in Table 4) 
ROBOT: -2.16+(8.7*0.3)=0.71 (close to 0.42 in Table 4) 
Note that all coefficients have the expected sign, i.e. inclusion of GPA reduces 
the positive effect of high school on the target, as expected. Again note that all the 
controls are strikingly similar to the previous regressions. 
The above analysis shows that education is a good predictor of behavior. Better 
education – having completed high school or tertiary education – and higher grades in 
high school lead to guesses closer to the target number and to a higher likelihood of 
correct optimization. In the second period, guesses improve if the distribution of the 
previous period is seen. The coefficients are not only statistically significant, but also of 
an economically large magnitude. Thus, education matters for game play. 
 
4.6 Step-Level Reasoning and Socio-Economic Variables 
We previously saw, that subjects who played step-2 in the first period did not 
exhibit a distinct pattern in REPEAT. Now, we will see if the socio-economic variables 
can explain the steps of reasoning applied. More specific, we will focus on the 
predictions of step-1 and step-2 play, and let the absolute difference to this number be 
the dependent variable. 
In the first period, step-1 and step-2 corresponds to 33 and 22, respectively. In 
REPEAT, step-1 corresponds to 21.605 (assuming step-0 to pick the average of the first 
period) and step-2 corresponds to 14.403. Note, that step-2 is (almost) the same as the 
actual target number for both periods.  
Table 6 below shows the regressions for both the first and second period. The 
first two columns report step-1 and step-2, respectively, for the first period, whereas 
column 3 and 4 reports step-1 and step-2 for REPEAT.  
For the first period, we find that the regression have similar sized coefficients and 
similar statistical significance as the difference to the target number, we saw in Table 5. 
For step-1 (i.e. the difference to 33), we find very few statistical significant coefficients. 
In particular, we see that GPA and high school completion are insignificant. Tertiary 
education is however significant, but the coefficient is much smaller than it is in the 
difference to step-2 play. We can thus conclude that in the first period, education as a 
whole – and in particular high school completion and better grades in high school – are 
more a characteristic of step-2 players than of step-1 players.  
Table 6: Regression Results – Difference to step-1 and step-2 play 
Method TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT 
Dependent variable 
Period 1   
Diff. to Step-
1 
Period 1   
Diff. to Step-
2 
REPEAT   
Diff. to Step-
1 
REPEAT   
Diff. to Step-
2 




  (1.273) (1.481) 
Gender 1=Male -1.99*** -3.62*** 0.18 -2.17 
 
(0.578) (0.698) (1.209) (1.407) 
Age Years -0.04 0.00 -0.10* -0.07 
 
(0.027) (0.033) (0.054) (0.063) 
Income after tax and interests -0.15 -0.43 -0.11 -0.12 
Gross income yields same results  coefficients and significance  (0.275) (0.332) (0.534) (0.621) 
Education, secondary (Completed High School) 3.47 9.05** 13.39** 18.09** 
 
(3.217) (3.889) (6.724) (7.826) 
Education, tertiary (Completed BA, MA or PhD) -1.39** -3.04*** 2.05 0.85 
 
(0.639) (0.771) (1.314) (1.529) 
High School * GPA in High School -0.55 -1.37*** -1.64** -2.38*** 
 
(0.375) (0.453) (0.78) (0.907) 
Constant 20.81*** 23.00*** 12.80*** 14.14*** 
  (1.174) (1.418) (2.476) (2.879) 
Sigma 13.14*** 15.88*** 12.25 14.24*** 
Standard deviation of errors (0.186) (0.224) (0.375) (0.437) 
Control for type of employment: No No No No 
Observations 2568 2568 535 535 
Standard deviation in parentheses  
    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
   
 
For REPEAT, we similarly see that step-2 play is very similar to the results 
provided in Table 5. The main difference between step-1 and step-2 in REPEAT is, that 
the distribution of choices in period 1 had no explanatory power for step-1 players. Thus, 
subjects who saw the distribution are more step-2 players than they are step-1 players. 
However, the causality is not evident. We find the educational variables to be of similar 
statistical significance, but the coefficients are smaller for step-1 players than for step-2 
players. Hence, the relationship between step-play and education is qualitatively the 
same, but the impact of education on step-2 players is larger than on step-1 players. For 
REPEAT we can conclude that education characterizes step-2 players more than step-1 
players, whereas feedback view only characterizes step-2 players.  
 
4.5 Robustness Checks 
To test the robustness of the above reported results, different specifications have 
been run. For instance, all regressions have been run with additional independent 
variables. The type of employment, using four dummy variables (self-employed, leading 
position, unemployed, and retired) resulted in no significant employment coefficients. 
Similarly, we got insignificant coefficients on a dummy for a university degree (a 
bachelor, a master or a PhD) and “years of schooling”. We also used gross income rather 
than income after tax and interests, but this led to similar coefficients that were also 
insignificant. Instead of using age, we ran regressions using age squared and found 
similarly that the coefficients were insignificant. However, in restricted regressions 
where we dropped independent variables we found that the age coefficient became 
statistically significant. Burnham et al. (2007) find that age and guesses are significantly 
correlated when using a comparable regression setup. However, their controls are fewer 
than ours and self-reported. We believe this correlation to be spurious, since it does not 
remain significant when we introduce additional controls from our high-quality data.  
As an independent variable we also included the time subjects spent in the 
second period from loading the website to submitting their guess. Most subjects guessed 
within a short time after loading the page for the first time. However, it was possible to 
load the page and close the browser only to return at a later point in time to finish the 
experiment. As some subjects did this, we only used the time measurement if it was less 
than 15 minutes not to give too much weight to these relatively few observations with 
extreme values, compared to the average 3 minutes and 20 seconds it took subjects to 
submit their guess. Including the time spent was in some specifications significant, and 
led to a less significant distribution dummy. A likely reason is that subjects who clicked 
the distribution link also spent more time before submitting their guess. Consequently, 
we dropped the time usage in the main specifications.  
Instead of using the difference to the winning number in the first period as 
independent variable, the same regressions have been run with the guess in the first 
period. This yields coefficients of similar sign, magnitude and significance.  
Finally, all regressions were conducted with those independent variables included 
that were known in both the matched and the unmatched data set. Here, the coefficients 
were similar in sign, magnitude and significance, supporting the view that no systematic 
bias was introduced during the matching with Statistics Denmark data. 
 
5  Conclusion 
We have presented a large-scale newspaper and internet guessing game 
experiment with 19,196 participants. This is the largest guessing game ever, and the first 
two-period newspaper experiment. Furthermore, it is the first newspaper experiment 
with randomized treatment allocation. We have as such, carried many of the usual 
advantages of laboratory experiment over to newspaper and internet experiments. A two-
period newspaper/internet experiment is a methodological novelty, that can be applied to 
many different types of experiments.  
Moreover, we have matched our participants in the experiment with registry data 
and obtained socio-economic background variables that we use in analyzing subjects 
behavior. We find that subjects that attended high school, and subjects with a tertiary 
education make better guesses in the first period of game. Also, subjects with better high 
school grades make better guesses, whereas age and income have no effect. Finally we 
find evidence that supports a causal relationship between getting detailed feedback about 
what others did in the prior period and guessing lower and closer to the winning number. 
We find that step-level theory explains behavior well in the first period. 
Repeating the experiment leads to convergence towards the equilibrium, and also here 
step-level reasoning explains behavior. Reducing the game to an individual optimization 
problem reveals that slightly more than one tenth of the subjects are able to solve the 
optimization problem, and that these “optimizers” outperform other subjects in the 
strategic guessing game. In fact, subjects who fail to optimize exhibit the typical choice 
pattern observed in guessing games. Disequilibrium behavior can thus to a large extent 
be explained by bounded rational behavior, and to a minor extent by strategic 
uncertainty. Thus, the typical distribution observed in these guessing games, can be 
explained by non-sophisticated players using step-level theory. However, about one 
tenth of the players act strategically and choose non-equilibrium guesses because of 
strategic uncertainty.  
As such we have in a rich environment that combines a large-scale internet 
experiment with socio-economic registry data shown, that bounded rationality plays a 
large role for disequilibrium behavior, and that subjects with the right education help to 
mitigate disequilibrium and that they outperform subjects without education. 
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The corresponding step, k, of each individual guess, gi, is calculated for the 1625 
participants in the REPEAT treatment by solving for k in the equation: gi = (2/3)
k 
*R, 
where the reference number R is 50 in the first period, and 32.407 in REPEAT.  
In the table, we present the steps in grouped intervals, such that any guess with a step 
lower than 0.5 is represented as “0”, a step btw. 0.5 and 1.5 as “1” and so forth. 
 












d < 0 d = 0 d = 1 d = 2 d = 3 d = 4 d > 4
FIRST, n=19196










d < 0 d = 0 d = 1 d = 2 d = 3 d = 4 d > 4
REPEAT, n=1625
KS (EJ 2005), n=35















Number of Guesses = 2599
 















Number of Guesses = 542
 
 













Number of Guesses = 524
 
 




Difference in Difference First 
period - REPEAT 
Feedback 1=Clicked distribution link in PERIOD 2 0.99 
 
(1.868) 
Gender 1=Male -0.84 
 
(1.772) 
Age Years 0.16** 
 
(0.080) 
Income after tax and interests -1.22 
Gross income yields same results  coefficients and significance  (0.783) 
Education, secondary (Completed High School) -13.52 
 
(9.914) 
Education, tertiary (Completed BA, MA or PhD) -2.63 
 
(1.935) 




  (3.472) 
Sigma 18.07*** 
Standard deviation of errors (0.552) 
Control for type of employment: No 
Observations 535 
Standard deviation in parentheses  






The original instructions were in Danish. Below follows an English translation. 
 
The first period: 
The participants were told the rules, and that the purpose of the competition would be 
revealed four days after the competition closed for new entries, where the newspaper ran 
an article about the game and about experimental economics. 
More specifically, the participants were told: 
Headline: “Guess a number and win 5,000 kroner” 




You must submit a guess according to these rules: 
 Pick a number between 0 and 100 (both included), which you believe will be the 
closest to two thirds of the average of all submitted. 
 Your guess does not have to be an integer 
 You must submit your guess by Sonday the 18. September [2005] at 12:00. 
 The winner is the reader closest to two thirds of the average off all the submitted 
numbers. 
 If more than one participant are equally close, the prize will be split among them. 
 The winner – and the purpose of the competition – will be revealed in Politiken and at 
politiken.dk on Thursday den 22. September [2005]. 
 Employees of JP/Politikens Hus can not participate in the competition. 
 
Submit your guess (between 0 and 100 – both included): __________ 






    < Submit your guess > 
The second period: 
The instructions consist of two parts. A common part, that was the same for all 
treatments and a treatment specific part, explaining the treatment specific rules. 
 
Common part: 
In September 2005, you participated in “Guess a Number” at the webpage of Politiken, 
with the possibility of winning DKK 5,000. 
Now, we again offer you the opportunity to win DKK 5,000. 
This time, only the 19,196 participants of the first period can participate. The 
participants of this round will be randomly divided into five different groups. In each 
group, a prize of DKK 5,000 will be awarded (such that the total prize pool is DKK 
25,000). 
Just as in the first round, the rules are that: 
Your guess does not have to be an integer 
If more than one participant are equally close, the prize will be split among them. 
You must submit your guess by Wednesday the 21. March 2007 at 12:00. 
 
In the first round the average of all guesses were 32.407. 
The winning number (which was 2/3 of the average of all guesses) was 21.605 
Your guess in the first round was [the participants guess in the first period was displayed 
here]. 
You can read more about the first competition from September 2005 in the newspaper 
article from Politiken, 22. September 2005 [link opens a new window]. In addition, you 
can see a graphic distribution of guesses in the first round here [link opens a new 
window]. 
 
Treatment Specific Part: 
REPEAT: In your group, the rules in this round are the same as in the first round. 
Pick a number between 0 and 100 (both included), which you believe will be the closest 
to two thirds of the average of all submitted. 
The winner is the participant closest to two thirds of the average off all the submitted 
numbers. 
The lower you expect the other to choose on average, the lower you should choose.  
So, you should choose 2/3 of your expectation of the average of the others‟ guesses. 
 
ROBOT: In your group, the rules in this round are slightly different from the first round. 
You will be matched with a computer.  
The computer chooses a random number between 0 and 100 (both included). All 
numbers appear with the same probability. 
Pick a number between 0 and 100 (both included), which you believe will be the closer 
to two thirds of the average of the computers number and your number.  
A participant in your group will be picked at random. Is this participants number closer 
than the computers number to two thirds of the average, the participant will win. 
So, the lower you expect the computers number, the lower you should choose.  
 




Step-level Thinking and 
Changes in the Action Set 
 
 














Guessing games have been studied in many variations and 
parameterizations, yet few studies have analyzed the effect of a 
change in parameters from one period to another. Here, we 
study how a change in the action set between the first and the 
second period of a large-scale internet guessing game influences 
behavior. Although not predicted by existing theories, we find a 
dramatic change in behavior that corresponds exactly to the 
relative change in the action set. However, if the assumptions of 
the theories are normalized by the relative change in the action 
set, the predictions explain the observed behavior. Thus, with 
appropriate assumptions, step-level thinking is a good predictor 
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Introduction 
Since the introduction to the experimental literature in the seminal paper by Nagel (1995), 
guessing games have been much studied, and theories have been develop to explain the behavior we 
typically observe in this class of game. Although the game has been studied and compared across 
many variations and parameterizations (e.g. Güth, Kocher and Sutter (2002) and Morone and Morone 
(2008)), very few studies have devoted any attention to how such changes are anticipated by the 
participants.  
In this paper we analyze how behavior is affected when subjects experience that the action set 
is extended from the first to the second period in a 2-period game. Although not predicted by existing 
theories, we show that behavior is very different when changing the action set. We then show how 
modifications to the assumptions of the existing theories can predict the observed pattern. More 
specifically we show that the model‟s reference point should be normalized by the change in the action 
set.  
The guessing game is a very nice workhorse to study such a change. There exists vast 
experimental evidence on the game, there is a simple game theoretic prediction, the game is absent of 
social and risk preferences, and theories have been developed to explain the non-Nash behavior 
typically observed in the game. The general structure of the guessing game is quite simple. N 
participants simultaneously choose a number xi (i = 1,…,N) from the closed interval l to h. The guess 
with the minimum distance to the “target number”, defined as p times the average number  
(X = N 
-1
 xi), wins a prize. If several people are equidistant to the target number, the prize is equally 
shared among these people.  
The distribution of choices normally observed in these guessing games are well explained by 
step-level (or level-k) theories, as proposed by e.g. Nagel (1995), Camerer, Holt and Ho (2004) and 
Stahl (1996). These theories assume that subjects apply step level cognition and characterize 
participants into different categories according to their cognitive depth of reasoning. In these models, 
subjects perceive that they themselves are the most sophisticated and they best respond to their belief 
of the other players applying less steps than themselves. The intuition of the models is as follows. A 
step-0 type is assumed to pick some reference number x0 (an equivalent interpretation is that all step-0 
players pick x0 on average). A step-1 type believes everybody else to be step-0 players, and picks the 
best reply to step-0. Thus, a step-k type believes everyone else to be of type k-1, and best replies to this 
(In the cognitive hierarchy model proposed by Camerer et al. (2004) a type k is assumed to best reply 
to a distribution of types of less cognitive depth than k). 
Most of the step-level theories are developed for a one-shot purpose. However, Nagel (1995) 
apply the theory to a repeated guessing game. It is then assumed that step-0 play corresponds to 
playing the average number of the last round.  
In the first round as well as in both treatments of the second round, standard game theory 
predicts a single pure strategy Nash equilibrium of 0. Yet, numerous studies of the game have shown 
that behavior differs from the Nash prediction
1
. In the laboratory, repeating the game has lead to 
convergence towards the Nash equilibrium. We here present the first repeated large-scale guessing 
game and provide novel insights as to the convergence in a large-scale guessing game.  
Here, we present a large-scale experiment with a novel design to address how subjects in a 
large-scale experiment adjust guesses in a repeated setting when the environment is non-stable. We let 
subjects play one of the most common parameterizations, with p=2/3, l=0 and h=100, in the first 
round. In the second round, we introduce two treatment variations. The first treatment (REPEAT) is 
similar to previous guessing game experiments (see e.g. Nagel (1995) and Kocher & Sutter (2005)), in 
that it is a simple repetition of the first round. However, it is the first large-scale repeated guessing 
game. Here we find that subjects play similar to previous laboratory studies, in that repetition leads to 
convergence towards the Nash prediction. Just as first round behavior has been found similar in large-
scale and laboratory studies, we conclude that this also holds for second period behavior. 
The second treatment (EXTEND) takes a different approach, in that we extend the action set by 
setting h=180. We should expect no difference in behavior in REPEAT and in EXTEND. Standard 
game theory would predict the behavior in REPEAT and EXTEND to be the same, namely that 
everyone pick the equilibrium of 0. The prediction of step-level thinking rests on the assumption that 
step-0 types pick the average of the previous round, and would thus also not predict any difference in 
behavior. Yet, we find that behavior differs dramatically. However, if we normalize the submitted 
guesses by 1.8 (the factor with which the action set was extended), the provided guesses in the two 
treatments are the same. Thus we show that subjects facing a change in the range of possible guesses 
apply the same reasoning as subjects in the stable environment, but that they adjust for the change in 
parameters. By modifying the assumption on step-0 play in step-level theory, we can explain the 
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 In Tyran & Øvlisen (2009) we show that bounded rationality and to some extent strategic uncertainty causes this non-
Nash behavior. 
behavior observed. Rather than assuming step-0 types to play the average of the last period, we assume 
that step-0 types pick the normalized average of the last period. 
In the next section the game and experimental design will be introduced in more detail, just as 
our design and procedure will be explained. Then a section on the results and analysis follows, 
preceding a short conclusion. 
Design 
The experiment consists of two rounds and two treatments.
2
 The first round was announced in 
the hard-copy version of the Danish daily newspaper Politiken and on its website. Participation was 
only possible through their website, and not limited to subscribers of the newspaper but open to all 
visitors at the newspaper‟s website.  
In the first round, all participants played the standard guessing game with l = 0, h = 100 and p 
= 2/3, and could guess any real number (allowing for up to nine digits) between 0 and 100 (both 
included). In total 19,196 participants took part to win the prize of DKK 5000 (at the time approx. 
$1,000 or € 670), that was split equally among the four winners that came closest to the target number. 
In the second round, all previous participants were invited to participate again. The participants 
in the second round were randomly allocated to one of five different treatments, each with a prize of 
DKK 5000 (at the time approx. $1000 or € 670). In addition to a short description of the experiment 
(see appendix), they were informed about their own guess, the average guess and the target number of 
the first round. The information page also included two links providing additional information (in a 
pop-up window). One link showed the distribution of guesses in the first round (similar to Figure 1) 
and the other link displayed a newspaper article about the guessing game, with detailed comments of 
how to think of the game (Schou 2005). 7,635 of the 19,196 invited participants took part in the 
second round. 
In this paper, we analyze two treatments in the second round. Treatment REPEAT with 1,625 
participants was simply a repetition of the first round, where the rules and parameters remained 
unchanged with l = 0, h = 100 and p = 2/3. The other treatment, EXTEND, had 1,560 participants. 
Here, the rules were slightly different in that we changed the upper bound of guesses to h = 180, 
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 A total of five treatments were run in the second period. The other three treatments address a different question and 
are discussed in the companion papers Tyran and Øvlisen (2009) and Øvlisen(2009). A more detailed description of 
the game and the experiment can be found in Tyran & Øvlisen (2009).  
keeping p = 2/3 and l = 0 unchanged. Thus, rather than choosing numbers between 0 and 100, as in the 
first period and in REPEAT, the action set was extended such that subjects in EXTEND could choose 
numbers between 0 and 180.  
All present theories that have been applied to guessing games suggest the same: namely that 
we should observe the same behavior in REPEAT and in EXTEND. In EXTEND, we simply add some 
high numbers that should not affect choices since they are in a region not considered by the players. 
In the next section we will see, that the actual behavior is much different from what our 
theories suggests. 
Results 
The results of the first period with 19,196 participants are similar to previous large-scale 
guessing games (e.g. Bosch-Domènech, Montalvo, Nagel and Satorra 2002). Tyran & Øvlisen (2009) 
provides an in-depth analysis of the experiments of the first round, where the average was 32.4 and the 
winning number 21.6. The results exhibit the typical distribution of choices, with the spikes predicted 
by the step-level model.  
Figure 1 show the guesses in the REPEAT treatment. Compared to the winning number of the 
first period, the winning number of 14.4 is now closer to the Nash prediction and is 2/3 lower than the 
first period. We also see the distribution of guesses to be much more condensed, and that most choices 
are around the winning number of 14.4. This is very similar to previous experiments performed in the 
laboratory (Nagel 1995). We find similar convergence towards the Nash prediction in a large-scale 
experiment with heterogeneous subjects as we see in the laboratory. The result is well explained by 
level-k thinking, where step-0 players are assumed to on average pick 32.4 (the average of the first 
period). The model would predict that step-1 players choose 21.6, step-2 players choose 14.4, and 
step-3 players choose 9.6. When we look at the distribution, these values are where we find the largest 
spikes. The largest spike at 14 corresponds to step-2 play, and the second-largest spike at 10 
corresponds to step-3 play. Thus, we find the same behavior in a large-scale repeated internet guessing 
game with 1,625 subjects as we find in the typical laboratory studies with much smaller group sizes.  
Figure 2 show the guesses in the EXTEND treatment. When comparing to Figure 1, it is 
immediately clear that the two distributions are very different (t-test, p=0.00, Mann-Whitney p=0.00, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov p=0.00). Guesses in EXTEND are much more dispersed than guesses in 
REPEAT, and the average number of 40.91 is higher than the average in the first period. Whereas we 
observe convergence towards the Nash-prediction in REPEAT, we observe the opposite in EXTEND. 
From both the step-level models and standard game theory, we predicted behavior in the two 
treatments to be the same. Yet we observe a strikingly different behavior in the two treatments.  
We find approximately the same fraction of strictly dominated choices in both treatments (3 
per cent choosing above 67 in REPEAT and 2 per cent choosing above 120 in EXTEND). If the 
observations in REPEAT were bulked at 100, it could be because subjects preferred numbers outside 
the action set. However, we can rule this out since only two subjects choose 100 in REPEAT. 
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This seems like a striking and peculiar finding. Yet, we might gain some useful insight when 
we look for the largest spike in Figure 2. We find that the largest spike at 39, since just below 4 per 
cent of the participants (57 subjects) guessed higher than 38.5 and below 39.5 (both included). Of 
these 57 guesses, 18 subjects guessed exactly 38.889. In REPEAT, less than one per cent (4 subjects) 
chose guesses in this interval, an no one guessed at 38.889.  
At first glance, this is indeed a peculiar number to choose for so many people. However, a 
closer look reveals what logic these subjects followed. They have taken the winning number of the 
first period, and adjusted it by the relative change in the action set. The action set was extended by a 
factor 1.8, and since the winning number in the first period was 21.605, we get: 21.605*1.8=38.889. If 
we relax the precision of the adjustment a little, we can even explain the spike we find at 40.  
Now we incorporate this logic into the step-level model. Taking the average number of the 
previous period and adjusting it with 1.8 thus gives what we will call the “normalized step-0 play”. 
Normalized step-0 types are thus assumed to guess 32.5*1.8=58.5, normalized step-1 players will 
consequently choose 39, and normalized step-2 types will choose 26.  
We have already seen how the largest spike in Figure 2 can be explained by normalized step-1 
players. Similarly, we can explain the large spikes at 26 by normalized step-2 types. The spike at 27 
can be explained using the relaxed precision of the adjustment on step-0 players. 
Now, if this logic was to hold true we could simply scale all guesses in EXTEND downwards 
by 1.8, and we should get similar distribution of guesses EXTEND and REPEAT. Figure 3 shows the 
kernel density of the guesses in REPEAT and the normalized guesses in EXTEND (i.e. the guesses 
divided by 1.8). We see that the distributions are strikingly similar, although testing does not confirm 
that the two distributions are the same (t-test, p=0.06, Mann Whitney p=0.03, Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
p=0.00). The distribution of REPEAT still exhibits lower guesses and more guesses around the 
winning number than observed in the normalized EXTEND.  




In this paper, a two-period large-scale guessing game is presented. In the first period our results 
are similar to other comparable large-scale and laboratory studies. In the second period, we present 
two different treatments.  
The first treatment is simply a repetition of the first period. We find convergence towards the 
Nash equilibrium, similar to that of previous laboratory experiments. Convergence has not previously 
been studied in a large-scale experiment, and we conclude that the behavior in the repeated large-scale 
guessing game is similar to that of laboratory studies. 
The second treatment introduces a change in the environment in that the action set is extended. 
Rather than allowing for numbers between 0 and 100 (as in the first period), subjects can choose 
numbers from 0 to 180.  
Step-level models would predict the same behavior in the two treatments, applying the usual 
assumption that step-0 players pick the mean of the previous period (Nagel, 1995). Yet we observe a 
strikingly different behavior. Whereas there was convergence towards the Nash equilibrium in the 
repeated game, the treatment with the extended action space showed the opposite, namely higher 
numbers being chosen on average. 
However, if we modify the usual assumption for step-0 play, and instead assume step-0 to pick 
the normalized mean of the previous period, the predictions of the two treatments would not be the 
same. In our example, step-0 would not choose the average of the previous period, but rather the 
average times 1.8 – the factor by which the action set was extended. Applying this assumption, we can 
explain the spikes we observe in the data. Normalizing the entire distribution of choices by 1.8 reveals 
a strikingly similar distribution in the repeated treatment and in the treatment with extended action set. 
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Appendix - Instructions 
The original instructions were in Danish. Below follows an English translation. 
 
The first period: 
The participants were told the rules, and that the purpose of the competition would be revealed four 
days after the competition closed for new entries, where the newspaper ran an article about the game 
and about experimental economics. 
More specifically, the participants were told: 
Headline: “Guess a number and win 5,000 kroner” 
Politiken gives you the opportunity to win 5,000 kroner. All you have to do is to guess a number. 
 
 
You must submit a guess according to these rules: 
 Pick a number between 0 and 100 (both included), which you believe will be the closest to two 
thirds of the average of all submitted. 
 Your guess does not have to be an integer 
 You must submit your guess by Sonday the 18. September [2005] at 12:00. 
 The winner is the reader closest to two thirds of the average off all the submitted numbers. 
 If more than one participant are equally close, the prize will be split among them. 
 The winner – and the purpose of the competition – will be revealed in Politiken and at politiken.dk 
on Thursday den 22. September [2005]. 
 Employees of JP/Politikens Hus can not participate in the competition. 
 
Submit your guess (between 0 and 100 – both included): __________ 






    < Submit your guess > 
The second period: 
The instructions consist of two parts. A common part, that was the same for all treatments and a 
treatment specific part, explaining the treatment specific rules. 
 
Common part: 
In September 2005, you participated in “Guess a Number” at the webpage of Politiken, with the 
possibility of winning DKK 5,000. 
Now, we again offer you the opportunity to win DKK 5,000. 
This time, only the 19,196 participants of the first period can participate. The participants of this round 
will be randomly divided into five different groups. In each group, a prize of DKK 5,000 will be 
awarded (such that the total prize pool is DKK 25,000). 
Just as in the first round, the rules are that: 
Your guess does not have to be an integer 
If more than one participant are equally close, the prize will be split among them. 
You must submit your guess by Wednesday the 21. March 2007 at 12:00. 
 
In the first round the average of all guesses were 32.407. 
The winning number (which was 2/3 of the average of all guesses) was 21.605 
Your guess in the first round was [the participants guess in the first period was displayed here]. 
You can read more about the first competition from September 2005 in the newspaper article from 
Politiken, 22. September 2005 [link opens a new window]. In addition, you can see a graphic 
distribution of guesses in the first round here [link opens a new window]. 
 
Treatment Specific Part: 
REPEAT: In your group, the rules in this round are the same as in the first round. 
Pick a number between 0 and 100 (both included), which you believe will be the closest to two thirds 
of the average of all submitted. 
The winner is the participant closest to two thirds of the average off all the submitted numbers. 
The lower you expect the other to choose on average, the lower you should choose.  
So, you should choose 2/3 of your expectation of the average of the others‟ guesses. 
 
EXTEND: In this round, the rules are in your group slightly different than in the first round.  
Pick a number between 0 and 180 (both included), which you believe will be the closest to two thirds 
of the average of all submitted. 
The winner is the participant who gets closest to two thirds of the average of all the submitted guesses. 
The lower you expect the other to choose on average, the lower you should choose.  
So, you should choose 2/3 of your expectation of the average of the others‟ guesses. 
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In this paper we present a two period large-scale internet experiment. First 
we develop a general formulation of target function in the guessing game. 
We show existence of equilibrium and provide conditions for uniqueness. 
Then we let subjects play an initial round of the guessing game to anchor 
them on low values. In the second round we present two treatments that 
differ only in their strategic property. We ask if behavior under strategic 
complements and strategic substitutes differs, and find that guesses under 
strategic substitutes are closer to the equilibrium prediction and exhibit 
higher depth of reasoning than guesses under strategic complements. 
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Introduction 
In this paper, we ask if behavior in the guessing game is different under strategic complements than 
under strategic substitutes, i.e. if it matters for behavior if the slope of the best reply function is 
positive or negative. We report experimental results from a two-period large-scale guessing game. 
In the first period, the 19,196 subjects play the standard guessing games (Nagel 1995). The first 
period anchors subjects on “lower numbers”. In the second period, we adjust the action space and 
change the equilibrium value from the boundary to an interior equilibrium. We then assign subjects 
to two treatments that differ only in their strategic environment. We find that guesses under 
strategic substitutes are closer to the equilibrium value and exhibit larger depth of reasoning, than 
guesses under strategic complements.  
Since Moulin (1986) and Nagel (1995) introduced the guessing game in the literature, experiments 
with various parameterizations and variations have been performed using different types of target 
functions. In this paper, we propose a general model of the target function that allows for all 
possible variations of the guessing game. We show existence of equilibrium and provide conditions 
for uniqueness. The model captures all variations of the guessing game, and in particular it makes a 
change of the strategic environment easy. Thus, our formulation eases experimental design as well 
as the theoretical analysis of the game. 
The strategic environment is essential for any game. If the slope of the best-reply function is 
positive, we say that actions are strategic complements, whereas strategic substitutes is defined as a 
negative slope. Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) were among the 
first to study strategic complements and substitutes. Here, a simple intuition explains the difference 
in behavior that we observe when the strategic properties are changed. Under strategic 
complements, rational subjects have the incentive to mimic bounded rational subjects, whereas in 
strategic substitutes rational subjects have an incentive to act in the opposite way of the bounded 
rational subjects. Camerer and Fehr (2006) apply the same logic to explain how behavior in 
business entry games (with strategic substitutes) comes surprisingly close to the equilibrium 
prediction, whereas behavior in the (classic) guessing game (with strategic complements) 
systematically deviates from equilibrium prediction.  
A recurring theme in dealing with strategic properties is the issue of Cournot and Bertrand 
competition. Quanties in Cournot competition are strategic substitutes, while prices are strategic 
complements in Bertrand. Being the two workhorse models of industrial organization, the theme 
has gained some attention (e.g. Davis 2008). Suetens and Potters (2007) show experimentally that 
there is more tacit collusion in a Bertrand than in Cournot setting. However, a ceteris paribus 
comparison between treatments is not possible. 
Fehr and Tyran (2008) present one of the first direct comparisons of behavior under strategic 
complements and substitutes. Using a price-setting game, they show that after a nominal shock, 
subjects equilibrate quicker under strategic substitutes than under strategic complements. The 
explanation follows the same intuition as above, namely that expectations are flexible and forward-
looking under strategic substitutes, but adaptive and sticky under strategic complements. Similarly, 
Suetens and Potters (2009) find that in two-player cooperation games, there is more cooperation 
when actions are strategic complements than when they are strategic substitutes.  
Closest to our analysis here is a recent paper by Willinger and Sutan (2009). They also compare 
behavior in the guessing game under strategic substitutes and complements. With subjects in groups 
of 8 people, they let subjects submit guesses between 0 and 100. In a one shot setting with an 
interior equilibrium of 60, they find that guesses under strategic substitutes come closer to 
equilibrium than guesses under strategic complements. Furthermore they find, that subjects in both 
treatments apply 1.5 steps of reasoning on average. However, their treatment variation does not 
only change the strategic environment – the slope of the best-reply function and the range of 
dominated actions is different between the two treatments. Our formulation of the target function 
ensures that the slope of the best-reply function and the range of dominated strategies remain the 
same in the two treatments. 
In this paper we confirm the finding of Willanger and Sutan (2009) that guesses are lower and 
further away from equilibrium under strategic complements than under strategic substitutes. 
However our results suggest that the depth of reasoning is larger under strategic substitutes than 
under strategic complements.  
We here report results from a two-period large-scale guessing game. In the first period, the 19,196 
subjects play the standard guessing games (Nagel 1995). This period anchor subjects on “lower 
numbers”. In the second period, subjects are assigned to either a treatment with strategic substitutes 
or strategic complements. We find that guesses under strategic complements are closer to the 
equilibrium value and exhibit larger depth of reasoning, than guesses under strategic complements. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. First a general theory of the target function of the 
guessing game is presented. It is shown that there exist a Nash equilibrium and the conditions for 
uniqueness are derived. Then the experimental design is explained, before the hypotheses are 
presented. After the results a detailed discussion on how the results relate to step-level theory 
follows, before we conclude. 
Theory 
In the guessing game, N participants simultaneously guess a number between l and h. Let xi denote 
the guess of participant i = 1,…, N. The guess with the minimum absolute distance to the target 
number, T, wins a prize
1
. The target number is defined as  
( )T Z Ip X Z  
, where [ , ]Z l h  is a constant, X  is the average of all submitted numbers ( 1
iX N x ), p>0 is a 
parameter and I={-1,1} is an indicator that determines the strategic environment. For I=1 we have 
strategic complements and for I=-1 we have strategic substitutes. The parameter p > 0 is the 
(absolute) slope of the best reply function. Note that a negative p is equivalent to a change of I. 
The following proposition gives the equilibria of the guessing game. 
 
Proposition 1:  (i) There exist a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium x =xi i=1,…N 
with x =Z when I=-1  0 < p < 1, and  
(ii) there exist multiple equilibria x =xi i=1,…N with x ={Z,l,h} when 
I=1  p > 1, and 
(iii) with x =[l,h] for I=1  p=1. 
 
Proof: 
Since the game is about minimizing the absolute distance to T, the distance must in equilibrium be 
0. This can only be ensured when all subjects pick the same number, so the equilibrium is 




The first order condition of (1) is: 
0)1)()(1(2 IpxZIp  (2) 
Equation (2) has two solutions, namely x=Z and I=1  p=1. Since we are interested in the global 
minimum we must have that 
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 If several people are equidistant to the target number, different tie rules can be applied, e.g. that the prize is equally 
shared among these people. Alternatively, all subjects can be paid according to their distance to the target number. 
  0)1(2 2Ip   (3) 
Thus, if I=1  p=1 we do not have a unique solution. From (2) and (3) we get that x=Z is always an 
equilibrium and any x is an equilibrium when I=1  p=1. 
The target T can take on any number, but participants are restricted to guesses hlx , . If T<l then 
the minimization problem has the solution x=l. Similarly if T>h the solution is x=h. T only take on 
numbers hlT ,  if I=1  p>1. We thus have uniqueness of equilibrium if I=-1  0 < p < 1. ■ 
 
The table below summarizes this and provides an overview of the possible equilibria for given 
parameter values. 
 
Table 1: Equilibria Strategic Complements (I=1) Strategic Substitutes (I=-1) 
0 < p < 1  x = Z x = Z 
p = 1 [ , ]x l h  (including x=Z) x = Z 
p > 1 x = Z 
x = h 
x = l 
x = Z 
 
 
From Table 1 we see that regardless of the strategic environment and p, we always have that x=Z is 
a pure strategy equilibrium. We furthermore have, that this is the unique pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium under strategic substitutes. For strategic complements, x=Z is the unique pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium when 0 < p < 1. For strategic complements there are multiple equilibria for p  1.  
This formulation of the target function is general, and all existing descriptions of the guessing game 
are captured as special cases. It follows straightforward that the standard representation of the 




Theories building on cognitive depths of reasoning have been applied to explain behavior in 
guessing games, e.g. step-k in Nagel 1995 or the Cognitive Hierachy model (CH) in Camerer, Ho, 
Chong (2004). Following the model of Nagel (1995), we assume step-0 players to choose x0. Then 
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 Another example is the target function from Sutan and Willanger(2009), that arises by setting c=Zp – Z, I=1 for 
complements (in their paper called BCG+) and h=Z+pZ , I=– 1 for substitutes (BCG–). 
Again, this general formulation captures all existing guessing games, e.g. Nagel (1995) 
where 0xpx
k
k for I=1 and Z=0. 
We have in this section proposed a general formulation of the target function applied in the 
guessing game. We then showed existence of an equilibrium at x=Z, and saw that existence does not 
depend on the strategic environment or the parameter value of p. Then we showed the requirements 
for uniqueness of the equilibrium. We believe that this formulation is helpful in both designing and 
analyzing experimental designs and results. It highlights the key properties of the game, and allows 
for an easy treatment variation of the parameters of interest.  
Design 
The experiment has two treatments. Common for the two treatments are the parameters p = 2/3, l=0, 
h=180, Z=90 and N>2. We choose the p value such that we have a unique equilibrium in both 
treatments. To keep the complexity of the two treatments the same, the equilibrium must be in the 
middle of the interval. We thus choose an interval such equilibrium and step-level predictions are 
not prominent numbers. 
The two treatments differ in their strategic property, in that we consider an identical setup under 
strategic complements and strategic substitutes (I=1 and I=-1, respectively). We will denote the two 
treatments COMPLEMENTS and SUBSTITUTES. Applying the parameter values reveals the 












If we let *,i Cx and 
*
,i Sx denote the Nash equilibrium for strategic complements and substitutes, 




,i Sx =Z=90 in both 
treatments. The slope of the best-reply function is 2/3, where the sign of the slope – negative in 
COMPLEMENTS and positive in SUBSTITUTES – is the only difference between the treatments. 
Sonnemans and Tuinstra (2008) show that convergence towards equilibrium in guessing games 
with strategic complements depend heavily on the p-value, yet we keep p constant across 
treatments. 
Thus, the two treatments represent two different games. Yet, the game is fully symmetric in the 
sense that for any average choice of others, the distance to the Nash equilibrium is the same in both 
strategic environments. More specifically, finding the best reply given any expectation of the 
average choice of the others is equally difficult in the two strategic environments since both 
reaction functions have the same slope. The only difference is the sign. Thus, from a theoretic point 
of view, both environments offer the same degree of complexity. 
The experiment consists of two rounds. The first round was announced in the hard-copy version of 
the Danish daily newspaper Politiken and on its website. Participation was only possible through 
their website. Participation was not limited to subscribers of the newspaper, but open to all visitors 
to the newspapers website.  
In the first period, participants played the standard guessing game with l = 0, h = 100 and p = 2/3, 
and could guess at any real number (allowing for up to nine digits) between 0 and 100 (both 
included). In total 19,196 participants participated to win the prize of DKK 5000 (at the time 
approx. $1,000 or € 670). The prize was split equally among the four winners who all submitted the 
same guess closest to the target number. 
In the first round, subjects provided their guess, name, address, e-mail address, phone number and 
an optional comment. The e-mail address served as the unique identifier, and only one guess per e-
mail was allowed. The experiment was presented to the readers as a game and the scientific aim of 
the competition was not revealed. However, the readers were told that the aim and the result of the 
exercise would be discussed in the newspaper the following week. The experiment was open to 
participants for one week. Instructions can be found in the appendix. 
In the second round, we used the e-mail address provided in the first round to invite all previous 
participants to participate again. Thus, only participants of the first round could participate in the 
second round. Each participant received a personalized e-mail that contained a unique link. By 
clicking this link, they visited a personalized homepage and were randomly allocated to one of five 
different treatments
3
, each with a prize of DKK 5000 (at the time approx. $1000 or € 670). In 
addition to a short description of the experiment and the instructions (see appendix), they were 
informed about their own guess, the average guess and the target number of the first round. The 
information page also included two links providing additional information (in a pop-up window). 
One link showed the distribution of guesses in the first round and the other link displayed a 
newspaper article about the guessing game, with detailed comments of how to think of the game. 
This description included an intuitive explanation of the Nash equilibrium in plain words. As can be 
                                                 
3
 A total of five treatments were run in the second period. The other three treatments address a different question and 
are discussed in the companion papers – see Tyran and Øvlisen (2009) and Øvlisen (2009). 
seen from the appendix, the instructions of the game included a line indicating the slope of the best 
response function. Of the 19,196 invited participants, 7,635 participated in the second round. 
In the second round, treatment COMPLEMENTS had 1,477 participants and treatment 
SUBSTITUTES had 1,453 participants. Recall that both treatments differ from the first period in 
two ways. First, the action set was changed to h = 180. Second, we set Z=90 such that a new Nash 
equilibrium and target function arose. Subjects were informed that the rules had changed from the 
previous period in that they could guess a number between 0 and 180 (both included). In 
COMPLEMENTS, subjects were told that the winner(s) was determined as whoever got closest to 
30 plus 2/3 times the average number in their group. Participants in SUBSTITUES were told that 
the winner(s) was determined as whoever got closest to 150 minus 2/3 times the average of all 
numbers on their group. The prize in both treatments was DKK 5000, and participants were 
informed that it would be split equally in case of a tie.  
Hypotheses 
In this section we derive hypotheses of expected behavior from different theories. We begin with 
the equilibrium prediction. As we saw in the previous section, in both treatments 90 is a unique 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. This gives us the first hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The target number is 90 in both 
SUBSTITUTES and COMPLEMENTS. 
 
The next hypotheses are based on step-level theory (see Nagel 1995) that has proven a good 
predictor of behavior in this type of games. Step-level thinking assumes step-0 players to (on 
average) choose a reference number. In the first period of a guessing game, the reference number 
has previously been shown to be the middle of the interval. As the game is repeated, the reference 
number is normally assumed to be the average of the previous period. Since the parameters change 
from the first to the second period, where the participants face the two treatments, it is not clear 
what we should expect.  
First, suppose subjects regard the changed rules as a new experiment. We would then expect them 
to assume step-0 players to choose 90. Any k-step-players best reply to a k-1-step belief would yield 
the equilibrium choice of 90. Thus, the first step-level hypothesis coincides with hypothesis 1.  
Next, suppose that subjects consider the second period merely a second period of a repeated 
guessing game. Then they would assume step-0 players to choose an average of 32.4068, which was 
the average number in the first period. Step-1 players would expect everyone else to be step-0, and 
best-reply to that and choose 128 in SUBSTITUTES and 52 in COMPLEMENTS. Similarly, we 
can derive the predictions for step-2 and step-3 and we get arrive at the next two hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 2.1 SUBSTITUTES 
We expect spikes at 128, 64 and 107 corresponding to one, two, and three steps of 
iteration in SUBSTITUTES. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2 COMPLEMENTS 
We expect spikes at 52, 64 and 73 corresponding to one, two, and three steps of 
iteration in COMPLEMENTS. 
 
Note, that the steps in COMPLEMENTS are all below the equilibrium value of 90, whereas every 
second step in SUBSTITUTES is above. Also, note that all even steps are the same in the two 
environments. This is a characteristic of the design, and persist regardless of the assumed step-0 
play. 
Now, in this second period subjects face a different environment. Not only was the target function 
changed, but also the interval of possible numbers was extended from [0,100] to [0,180]. Øvlisen 
2009 show that subjects, when facing an extension of the action set, apply step-level thinking and 
adjust for the new action set. So let us suppose that subjects accounted for this nominal change in 
interval, such that they assumed step-0 players to choose the “adjusted average” of last period. The 
adjusted average is the average, adjusted for the change of interval, such that step-0 players on 
average would choose 32.4068*1.8=58.3. That gives us:  
 
Hypothesis 3.1 SUBSTITUTES 
We expect spikes at 111, 76 and 99 corresponding to one, two, and three steps of 
iteration in SUBSTITUTES. 
Hypothesis 3.2 COMPLEMENTS 
We expect spikes at 69, 76 and 81 corresponding to one, two, and three steps of 
iteration in COMPLEMENTS. 
 
When we compare the predictions in the two strategic environments, we see that the steps in 
COMPLEMENTS are much closer to one another than the SUBSTITUTES. Consequently, we 
should expect the overall distribution of choices to be more clustered in COMPLEMENTS whereas 
guesses in SUBSTITUTES should be more dispersed. 
As we saw in the theory section, the complexity of the two treatments is the same. Applying step-
level thinking, we would therefore expect the depth of reasoning in the two treatments to be the 
same as also Willanger and Sutan (2009) finds it.  
 
Hypothesis 4  
Depth of reasoning is the same in both treatments 
 
We now turn to the empirical findings.  
Results 
The distributions of guesses in the two treatments are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. In 
COMPLEMENTS, one participant came with a guess of 75.7 closest to the target of 75.55. In 
SUBSTITUTES, 4 participants came with a guess of 98 equally close to the target of 97.97 and split 
the prize. From Figure 1 and 2, it is immediately clear that the two distributions are not similar 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p=0.0000), Wilcoxon-Rank-Sum test (p=0.0000)). In both treatments, 
we see a large spike at the equilibrium value of 90. In COMPLEMENTS, around 6 percent of 
choices are 90 whereas just below 11 percent in SUBSTITUTES guess 90. The spike at 90 is by far 
the largest in both treatments. Despite the large spikes at 90, the vast majority of participants in both 
treatments chose something very different from 90. We can thus reject our Hypothesis 1, and 
further add that guesses in COMPLEMENTS and SUBSTITUTES do not come from the same 
underlying distribution. 
From hypothesis 2.1 we should expect spikes at 128, 64 and 107 in SUBSTITUES. Looking at 
Figure 2, we see that this is not the case. We find no sign of a spike at any of the three values, and 
the hypothesis finds no support. Similarly, we should expect spikes at 52, 64 and 73 in 
COMPLEMENTS. Here, we do not find any spikes either. Thus it seems that a simple application 
of step-level theory applying the average of the previous round (with a different action set) as step-0 
play is not applied by participants, and hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 find no support.  
The next two sets of hypotheses assume that the subjects apply step-level thinking, but adjust their 
expectations with the nominal re-scaling of the action set. The predictions from the two sets of 
hypothesis are very near to each other. In SUBSTITUTES, we find evidence supporting hypothesis 
3.1 in that a large spike is present at 111 (and the second largest spike very close at 110), 
corresponding to level-1 play. At the remaining predicted values, we find an above-average 
representation of guesses, but nothing that we would classify as a spike. 
For COMPLEMENTS we similarly find that the second largest spike with 3.5 per cent of the 
guesses is at 69, and the largest spike is very close at 70, as predicted by hypothesis 3.2. Thus, also 
in this treatment we that step-1 thinking is consistent with the spikes found. For the remaining step-
level predictions we find an above-average percentage of guesses. 
The average guess in COMPLEMENTS was 68.33 and the target number was 75.55. In 
SUBSTITUTES, the average was 78.05 and the target was 97.97. So, on average subjects guessed 
higher numbers in SUBSITUTES than in COMPLEMENTS. We also see that guesses – on average 
– were closer to the equilibrium in SUBSITUTES. If we compute the absolute differences to 90 in 
both treatments, we find – using a Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test – that not only are the differences not 
the same in the two treatments (z=4.992, p=0.0000), moreover the differences are larger in 
COMPLEMENTS than in SUBSTITUTES. So, participants’ guesses are closer to the equilibrium 
prediction in SUBSTITUTES than in COMPLEMENTS. 
Note that the second-largest spike is to the left of the equilibrium for COMPLEMENTS and to the 
right for SUBSITUTES, and that both correspond to adjusted level-1 players. This illustrates an 
effect that describes the overall distributions. In COMPLEMENTS we see that most the guesses are 
below the equilibrium value, and that there is strong inertia. This is implicitly expected from the 
hypothesis 3.1, since all steps are below 90. In SUBSTITUTES the average guess is also below 90. 
However, we find more observations above 90 in this treatment. This follows empirical finding is in 
line with the adjusted step-level models. 
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Furthermore we see that 77 per cent of the choices in COMPLEMENTS are below the equilibrium, 
whereas only 55 per cent in SUBSTITUTES are below. Similarly, we find that only 19 per cent of 
choices are above equilibrium in COMPLEMENTS, whereas 39 per cent of choices are above 
equilibrium in SUBSTITUTES. 
Since the steps are much closer to one another in COMPLEMENTS than in SUBSTITUTES, it is 
reasonable to expect the overall distribution to be more clustered in COMPLEMENTS than in 
SUBSTITUTES. This view is supported by the data, in that e.g. the standard deviation of guesses in 
COMPLEMENTS (31.2) is smaller than that of SUBSTITUTES (34.9). 
Now, let’s turn to look at the dominated choices. In COMPLEMENTS, 10 per cent of choices are in 
the range of dominated choices (<30), whereas only 1 per cent are within this range for 
SUBSTITUTES (>150). However, 13 per cent of choices in SUBSTITUTES are <30 and 1 per cent 
of choices in COMPLEMENTS are >150. So, the share of choices below 30 and above 150 in the 
two treatments is essentially the same. Thus, the choices in this interval are given by subjects not 
responding to the strategic environment of the treatment, and we can interpret these guesses as noise 
play (or equivalently step-0 players). The large number of guesses in the very low range of possible 
numbers (<30) is due to a very efficient anchoring on low numbers. The anchoring might work in 
multiple ways. Either, subjects play purely adaptive to the first round, and thus chooses a number 
below that of the average number of the first round, which essentially for almost all steps is below 
30. Yet another explanation consistent with the data could be that subjects were confused about the 
new rules of the game. It lies in the nature of running an internet experiment that some control is 
lost. Thus, if subjects believe they are facing the old environment – although the instructions clearly 
state otherwise – we should expect to find low guesses. However, the important thing is that 
subjects do not hold false beliefs of how the others will adjust to the new strategic environment. If 
this was the case, we should not expect to find the same fraction of guesses below 30 in 
SUBSTITUTES and COMPLEMENTS. 
In both treatments, we see many subjects choosing the equilibrium value of 90 in the second period. 
Now, we turn to see what they did in the first period. Figure A2 in the appendix show the 
distribution of guesses in the first period only for the subjects choosing 90 in SUBSTITUTES and 
COMPLEMENTS. The distribution of these choices are not the same for the two treatments (Mann 
Whitney, p=0.0038), with the main distinctions being more equilibrium guesses (0) and step-2 
guesses (22) for subjects choosing 90 in SUBSTITUTES, and more step-1 (33) guesses for subjects 
choosing 90 in COMPLEMENTSS. We conclude that behavior in the first round for the equilibrium 
players of the second round, was not the same.  
In this section we saw that the spikes we observe in the data are consistent with step-level thinking, 
using the average of the previous period, adjusted by the relative increase of the action set, as step-0 
play. The two treatments exhibit equally many dominated choices, but in SUBSTITUTES guesses 
are on average higher, less clustered and closer to equilibrium. Yet, the difference to the target 
value seem not different in the two treatments.  
Step-level thinking 
 
In the previous section we found that step-level thinking, assuming that step-0 players adjust the 
average of the previous period with the relative extension of the action set, explained the spikes 
observed in the data. Under this assumption we find that the average number chosen in 
COMPLEMENTS (68.33) is closest to step-1 play (68.9), whereas the average in SUBSTITUTES 
(78.05) is closest to step-2 play (75.91). The average action of the two treatments is thus 
characterized by different step-levels.  
In Table 2 below, the frequency of choices for the predicted steps using the above assumption is 




+/- 1 from prediction 
 
 
Step-1 0.051 0.029 
 
Step-2 0.017 0.020 
 
Step-3 0.022 0.034 
+/- 5 from prediction 
 
 
Step-1 0.131 0.075 
 
Step-2 0.097 0.077 
 
Step-3 0.093 0.097 
 
For both levels of tolerance, we see fewer step-1 players in SUBSTITUTES than in 
COMPLEMENTS, whereas the fraction of step-2 and step-3 players seem to be the same.  
In Table 3 below, we classify subjects according to the minimum difference to the step-prediction 





TABLE 3 COMPLEMENTS SUBSTITUTES 
Step-1 0.58 0.21 
Step-2 0.05 0.42 
Step-3 0.04 0.13 
Step-4 or higher 0.33 0.24 
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 We cannot measure the exact step-level in each treatment, using e.g the CH-model. Whereas it is possible to calculate 
a non-integer step for a given guess in COMPLEMENTS, it is not possible in SUBSTITUTES. The reason is simply, 
that any guess between step-0 and step-1 can be explained by any level-k, with k>2. We therefore let subjects be 
classified by the step with the minimal absolute distance to their guess. 
The distribution of steps are clearly different between the two treatments (Mann-Whitney, 
p=0.0000). We also see, that the main difference is that in SUBSTITUTES there are fewer step-1 
players, and in SUBSTITUTES there are more step-2 players. This is not due to prominent numbers 
or low anchoring, since the value of Step-2 play is the same in both treatments, namely 76. We can 
thus reject hypothesis 4, in that the depth of reasoning is higher in SUBSTITUTES than in 
COMPLEMENTS. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, we have introduced a new general formulation of the target function. We have proved 
existence of equilibrium, and derived the conditions for uniqueness. We argue, that this target 
function has many advantages both in designing experiments and analyzing experimental results. 
All treatment variations can easily be done by changing just one parameter.  
We report results from a two period large-scale internet experiment in which we do exactly that. We 
vary the strategic property of the game, and have one treatment with strategic complements and one 
with strategic substitutes. Using a rich data set with more than 1,400 subjects in each treatment, we 
find – similar to Willanger and Sutan (2009) – that the average guess in COMPLEMENTS is lower 
and further away from equilibrium than in SUBSTITUTES. Contrary to Willanger and Sutan 
(2009), our results suggests that subjects act consistent with higher steps of reasoning in 
SUBSTITUES. This is in line with previous experimental results in other games (e.g. Fehr and 
Tyran (2008)).  
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The original instructions were in Danish. Below follows an English translation. 
 
The first period: 
The participants were told the rules, and that the purpose of the competition would be revealed four 
days after the competition closed for new entries, where the newspaper ran an article about the game 
and about experimental economics. 
More specifically, the participants were told: 
Headline: “Guess a number and win 5,000 kroner” 
Politiken gives you the opportunity to win 5,000 kroner. All you have to do is to guess a number. 
 
 
You must submit a guess according to these rules: 
 Pick a number between 0 and 100 (both included), which you believe will be the closest to two 
thirds of the average of all submitted. 
 Your guess does not have to be an integer 
 You must submit your guess by Sonday the 18. September [2005] at 12:00. 
 The winner is the reader closest to two thirds of the average off all the submitted numbers. 
 If more than one participant are equally close, the prize will be split among them. 
 The winner – and the purpose of the competition – will be revealed in Politiken and at politiken.dk 
on Thursday den 22. September [2005]. 
 Employees of JP/Politikens Hus can not participate in the competition. 
 
Submit your guess (between 0 and 100 – both included): __________ 






    < Submit your guess > 
The second period: 
The instructions consist of two parts. A common part, that was the same for all treatments and a 
treatment specific part, explaining the treatment specific rules. 
 
Common part: 
In September 2005, you participated in “Guess a Number” at the webpage of Politiken, with the 
possibility of winning DKK 5,000. 
Now, we again offer you the opportunity to win DKK 5,000. 
This time, only the 19,196 participants of the first period can participate. The participants of this round 
will be randomly divided into five different groups. In each group, a prize of DKK 5,000 will be 
awarded (such that the total prize pool is DKK 25,000). 
Just as in the first round, the rules are that: 
Your guess does not have to be an integer 
If more than one participant are equally close, the prize will be split among them. 
You must submit your guess by Wednesday the 21. March 2007 at 12:00. 
 
In the first round the average of all guesses were 32.407. 
The winning number (which was 2/3 of the average of all guesses) was 21.605 
Your guess in the first round was [the participants guess in the first period was displayed here]. 
You can read more about the first competition from September 2005 in the newspaper article from 
Politiken, 22. September 2005 [link opens a new window]. In addition, you can see a graphic 
distribution of guesses in the first round here [link opens a new window]. 
 
Treatment Specific Part: 
COMPLEMENTS: In this round, the rules are in your group slightly different than in the first 
round. Pick a number between 0 and 180 (both included) which you believe will be the closest 
possible to 30 plus two thirds of the average of all submitted guesses. The winner is the participant 
who gets closest to 30 plus two thirds of the average of all the submitted guesses.  
 
The lower you expect the others to choose on average, the lower you should choose to win. 
Thus, you should choose 30 + 2/3 of your expectation of the others’ average guess. 
 
SUBSTITUTES 
In this round, the rules are in your group slightly different than in the first round. 
Pick a number between 0 and 180 (both included) which you believe will be the closest possible to 
150 minus two thirds of the average of all submitted guesses. The winner is the participant who gets 
closest to 150 minus two thirds of the average of all the submitted guesses.  
 
The lower you expect the others to choose on average, the higher you should choose to win. 
Thus, you should choose 150 –  2/3 of your expectation of the others’ average guess. 
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We experimentally study the effect of collective action on coordination in games with pareto-
rankable equilibria. We use a game in which coordination failure looms large absent 
collective action, i.e. when players make decentralized choices, and show that collective 
action is surprisingly ineffective in improving coordination. Study 1 shows that majority 
voting does not select a pareto-dominant equilibrium, does not prevent lock-in in a inferior 
equilibrium, and that, once coordination failed, it does not break lock-in despite the 
possibility to collectively “jump out of the trap”. Study 2 uses a setting in which coordination 
failure again looms large in decentralized play, but collective action per se is quite effective 
in improving coordination. Yet, we show that collective action has a limited coordinating 
effect by “setting a precedent”, i.e. in providing assurance by coordinating expectations on a 
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Introduction 
The fundamental problem of coordinating economic activities can in essence be captured 
in coordination games. In such games, players typically have incentives to make the same 
choices as others do. Examples are to drive on the same side of the street, use the same 
language, measurement unit or technical standard as others do. Such problems are in 
practice often solved by some form of collective choice, authoritarian decree, custom, or 
historical precedent. Once players are coordinated on the same action, outcomes tend to be 
stable if no single individual has an incentive to deviate from what has become the norm. 
Thus, players are in an equilibrium state. Yet, a defining feature of coordination games is 
the existence of multiple equilibria. In some cases, it is a matter of indifference which 
equilibrium players coordinate on. For example, it may not matter much whether cars 
drive on the left or the right side of the street, or whether engineers use centimeters or 
inches to measure distances. In other cases, equilibria may be pareto-rankable. In these 
cases, one equilibrium is better for everyone than another, yet players may be “trapped” in 
an inferior equilibrium. For example, a country may be stuck in poverty (a “development 
trap”) because investors are reluctant to invest simply because the level of other 
investments are low, or citizens may evade taxes because taxation is high as a result of 
common evasion (see Cooper 1999 or Crawford 1997 for overviews, Camerer 2003: Ch. 7 
or Tyran 2007a for further examples of coordination failure).  
In this paper, we study the effect of collective action in improving coordination in 
games with pareto-rankable equilibria. More specifically, we study if collective action 
prevents coordination failure and if it can break lock-in once coordination failure occurred. 
Collective action may prevent coordination failure by selecting the pareto-dominant 
equilibrium before the game is played in a decentralized way. The prevention effect is 
particularly strong if decentralized play would lead to eventual coordination on a 
dominated equilibrium but collective action selects the pareto-dominant equilibrium right 
away. But collective action may also have efficiency-increasing effects if collective action 
and decentralized play select the same equilibrium, simply by avoiding disequilibrium 
play. In any case, efficiency increases more if collective action selects an equilibrium and 
if collective action sets an effective “precedent”. A precedent is effective if the 
(equilibrium) outcome of collective action coordinates expectations of players in 
subsequent decentralized play on the equilibrium selected by collective action. 
Collective action can break lock-in once it occurs and enable players to collectively 
“jump” from an inferior to a superior equilibrium. This “curing effect” of collective action 
is particularly strong if (at least some of the) voters are aware that jumping to the pareto-
superior equilibrium is indeed in their interest and if collective action is setting an 
effective precedent. In this case, setting an effective precedent means that the precedent set 
by collective action dominates the precedent set by previous decentralized play. In 
contrast, a “curing effect” of collective action is absent if players’ experience of 
equilibrium play in the decentralized game sets a precedent for collective action. In this 
case, players would simply remain locked in the inferior equilibrium. The “curing effect” 
would also be of limited relevance if collective action succeeds in “jumping” to the 
superior equilibrium but players who are not assured quickly revert back to playing the 
inferior equilibrium. 
Intuitively, collective action ought to be very effective if all players are fully aware 
that everyone is indeed better off in the pareto-dominant equilibrium and if switching 
equilibria is costless. However, collective action, for example in the guise of majority 
voting, can also be expected to be quite effective in games in which some players are in 
doubt or confused about payoffs. As long as the confused players are in minority, 
collective action effectively prevents coordination failure by selecting a superior 
equilibrium. If confused players adapt to the precedent set by collective action in 
subsequent decentralized play, perfect coordination can be achieved right away and 
coordination failure be prevented through collective action. In this sense, collective action 
is more robust to a small amount of confusion than decentralized play and can therefore be 
expected to improve coordination.  
Another reason why collective action can be expected to improve coordination is 
that it eliminates or at least reduces strategic uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty may induce 
coordination failure even if most players are not confused about payoffs and the ranking of 
equilibria. The reason is that non-confused players may find it optimal not choose the 
action implied by the pareto-superior equilibrium in decentralized play for fear that others 
do not play it. However, non-confused players may find it optimal to vote for 
implementing the pareto-superior equilibrium because expectations matter less or are 
outright irrelevant in voting (We use two types of collective action in our experiment. In 
majority voting, the relevance of strategic uncertainty is reduced, while with a random 
dictator procedure it is totally eliminated). 
We test the effect of collective action on coordination in games in which at least 
some players are known to be uncertain or outright mistaken about the true payoffs in the 
game, and therefore about the ranking of equilibria. We think that using such games 
provides a more demanding, and perhaps more realistic, test for the ability of collective 
action to improve coordination. We use a coordination game developed by Fehr and Tyran 
(2007, henceforth FT) who present payoffs to players in nominal terms but actual 
payments to participants are in real terms. If something is “lost in translation”, to use an 
expression of Akerlof and Shiller (2009: 47), in going from nominal to real payoffs, i.e. if 
players are prone to money illusion, some players will be confused about the ranking of 
equilibria, and the non-confused players’ beliefs are perturbed. While our paper does not 
argue that money illusion is a relevant aspect of economic choices, and does not focus on 
the role of money illusion in causing coordination failure (see Fehr and Tyran 2007 on that 
issue), we note that recent literature suggests money illusion affects how people think 
(Shafir, Diamond and Tversky 1997, Weber et al. 2009) and how people behave in various 
strategic situations and markets (e.g. Noussair, Richter and Tyran 2008 for financial 
markets, Brunnermeier and Juillard 2008 for housing markets, see Akerlof and Shiller 
2009: 41-50, or Tyran 2007b for a survey). 
Study 1 introduces majority voting for inexperienced (INEXP) and experienced 
(EXP) voters into the game by FT which is known to produce massive coordination failure 
in the sense that decentralized play eventually converges to the pareto-inferior equilibrium. 
In EXP, voting takes place after 30 periods of decentralized play, when most players have 
experienced coordination failure and lock-in, to test if voting helps to break the lock-in. In 
INEXP, voting takes place in period 1, i.e. before players have experienced the 
coordination failure, to test if it selects the superior equilibrium and prevents coordination 
failure in the 30 periods of subsequent decentralized play. The results are surprisingly 
clear. Neither do voters select the superior equilibrium in period 1, nor do they manage to 
jump out of the trap after having experienced lock-in. Since voters do not succeed in 
selecting the superior equilibrium in period 1, collective action also does not coordinate 
expectations in subsequent decentralized play by setting a “precedent”.  
To further investigate the “precedent” effect, we modified the game by FT such that 
collective action is likely to be more successful in selecting the dominant equilibrium 
while maintaining the property from study 1 that coordination failure looms large in 
decentralized play. Important modifications concern a reduced strategy space and the use 
of a random dictator voting procedure, which totally eliminates strategic uncertainty for 
voters, rather than majority voting.
1
  
Study 2 has 3 treatments.
2
 In treatment NoVote, the coordination game is played in 
the usual decentralized way for 30 periods. NoVote serves as a benchmark against which 
the efficiency-improving effect of voting is measured. Treatment RepeatVote combines 
voting of inexperienced and experienced voters and allows for learning effects in voting. 
In this treatment, players vote and then play 9 periods of the decentralized game, and this 
sequence is repeated 3 times. Treatment AllVote has collective action in all 30 periods. 
We find that coordination failure indeed looms large in decentralized play and is almost 
perfectly eliminated in AllVote, as expected. We find that voting in RepeatVote is quite 
effective, but surprisingly does not coordinate expectations by setting a precedent.  
Two striking examples of regime switches may serve to illustrate how difficult it is 
in real life to solve coordination problems that seem straightforward from a theoretical 
perspective.
3
 The Swiss government planned to introduce daylight saving time (DST) 
simultaneously, i.e. coordinated with, the neighboring states in 1980. However, the 
decision was subject to popular referendum in which the introduction of DST was rejected 
by a majority of voters. As a result, Switzerland was a “time island” in the summer 1980, 
                                                 
1
 Democratic collective action is also quite likely to induce cooperation if voting requires unanimity. The 
drawback here is that unanimity is unlikely to obtain (even in a common interest situation) in the absence of 
communication. Yet, as Feri, Irlenbusch and Sutter (2009) show in a series of coordination games, the 
combination of communication and unanimity (reached by informal agreement rather than through a formal 
voting rule) does improve coordination in most cases, but the success is far from perfect.  
2
  Both studies were run using the program z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). In total, 167 undergraduate students (55 
for study 1, 112 for study 2) from all faculties were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Study 1 lasted 
about 90 minutes and average earnings were about €17, study 2 lasted about 30 minutes and earnings were 
about €12. 
3
 Mueller (2003: 17) suggests that coordination games should be particularly easy to solve by collective action: 
“if all problems caused by social interaction were as simple as deciding on which side of the road everyone 
should drive, one might well imagine that it would be possible to do away with the state. But, alas, this is not 
the case …” 
having a different time zone than its neighbors. Due to the high cost of such 
discoordination, the government overruled the referendum by authoritarian decree and 
introduced DST in 1981 anyway. A popular referendum launched in response to that 
decision with the purpose to abolish DST failed in 1981 and Switzerland has had DST ever 
since. A second illustrative example is the switch from left-hand to right-hand driving 
(RHD) in Sweden. In 1953, government proposed a switch to RHD mostly motivated by 
the wish to coordinate with neighboring countries with RHD, but the idea was 
controversial. A referendum was held in 1955 in which RHD was rejected by a vast 
majority (82.9%) of voters. The government decided to implement RHD anyway in 1963, 
and the switch was implemented in 1967, 14 years after the first government proposal. 
Sweden has had RHD ever since.  
These examples can be thought of as textbook-cases of pure coordination, i.e. games 
in which equilibria are not ranked which makes popular resistance in both examples 
difficult to understand. A potential explanation for resistance is that voters’ expectations 
have been so strongly coordinated by the historical precedent that they were not assured 
that collective action will set an effective precedent and disequilibrium may prevail after a 
regime switch. Alternatively, one may also argue that the equilibria are pareto-ranked – as 
the proponents of daylight saving time and right-hand driving argued in the referendum 
campaigns.
4
 We are uncertain about which interpretation is correct, and we believe that 
this was also true of many voters at the time. That is, we believe that not all voters had a 
clear idea of the payoffs or the ranking of the two equilibria when they made their choices. 
Thus, the examples serve to highlight that collective action in the guise of majority voting 
may or may not lead to coordination when payoffs are fuzzy. 
Given that collective action is an intuitive remedy to improve coordination and given 
the difficulties inherent in using field data to investigate the issue, it is surprising that only 
few experimental studies investigating collective action and coordination are available in 
the literature.
5
 Examples are Capra et al. 2009 who study voting to escape poverty traps, 
Cabrales, Nagel and Rodriguez Mora (2006) who study voting on redistribution and 
                                                 
4
  Another interpretation is that equilibria are not ranked and indeed have the same equilibrium payoffs, but 
that switching itself is costly. Indeed the Swedish parliamentary service estimated the cost of switching of 
to RHD to several hundred million Swedish crowns in 1967.  
5
  In contrast, collective action has been extensively studied in its ability to solve cooperation problems, e.g. Dal 
Bo, Foster and Putterman 2008, Noussair and Tan 2009, or Tyran and Feld 2005. 
subsequent effort choices. Feri, Irlenbusch and Sutter (2009) do not find, among other 
things, in a replication of the weakest link game (van Huyck et al. 1990) that voting or the 
random dictator procedure improves coordination or increases payoffs, provided that 
players had opportunity to communicate before decentralized and collective action. 
Collective action by decree seems to have mixed effects. Sefton and Yava (1996) 
find in a game with two pareto-rankable equilibria that the introduction of an outside 
authority (a third player) threatening to “regulate” play had little effect on outcomes. In 
contrast, Duffy and Kim (2005) find an external authority to be quite effective in a game 
where players chose to be peasants or predators and to produce or defend. 
 
2. Does collective action prevent or break coordination failure? -- Study 1 
Study 1 investigates if collective action improves coordination in a game in which 
coordination failure looms large absent collective action. Study 1 has two treatments which 
introduce collective action in the guise of majority voting either before participants 
experience coordination failure (INEXP) or after they have experienced coordination failure 
(EXP). Treatment INEXP serves to test if collective action prevents coordination failure by 
selecting the superior equilibrium from the start, treatment EXP serves to test if it can break 
lock-in if it occurred. In the periods without voting, both treatments use the same parameters 
and procedures as Fehr and Tyran (2007, henceforth FT). 
FT investigate a coordination game in which n participants are in the role of firms 
who simultaneously choose integer prices from 1 to 30 and the payoff of player i depends 
on the price i chooses and the average price chosen by the other (-i) players. FT study if 
money illusion causes coordination failure. They induce money illusion by representing 
payoffs in either real or nominal terms. In the nominal representation (their treatment NH), 
the payoff table shows nominal payoffs  which equal real payoffs  after “deflationing”, 
i.e. after division by the average price of other firms P-i. That is, i = i P-i.  
The coordination game has 3 pure-strategy equilibria. In equilibrium A, all players 
choose pA = 4 and the payoff is A = 28 for each player, equilibrium B prevails at prices of 
pB = 10 and the real payoff is B = 5 each, and equilibrium C, at prices pC = 27, has a 
payoff of C = 21 for all players. The corresponding nominal payoffs are A = 112, B = 
50, and C = 567 (see the nominal payoff table C1).
6
 That is, in the nominal 
representation, the coordination game exhibits a tension between real payoff dominance – 
equilibrium A pareto-dominates the other equilibria in real terms – and nominal payoff 
dominance – equilibrium C has higher nominal payoff than A. If players take nominal 
payoffs as a proxy for real payoffs, they may fail to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium 
A. FT find that money illusion causes coordination failure since coordination is close to 
perfect in the real representation but looms large in the nominal representation.
7
 We are 
not concerned with the cause of coordination failure in this paper but with the 
effectiveness of collective action in improving coordination. We therefore use FT’s game 
in the nominal representation as a workhorse since coordination failure looms large in this 
case.   
2.1. Voting ex post to break lock-in (treatment EXP) 
Treatment EXP has 3 phases. All phases use payoff table C2 (see appendix) showing 
nominal payoffs. Phase 1 is a replication of treatment NH in FT in which participants play the 
pricing game in groups of n = 5 for 30 periods. The game is played in a decentralized manner, 
i.e. each player independently and simultaneously picks a price. In decentralized play, the 
coordination problem has 2 aspects: players need to coordinate on the same action and 
players need to coordinate on the best action. To illustrate that the coordination problem 
potentially involves substantial strategic uncertainty
8
, we note that the game has 900 potential 
outcomes for a player in total of which 27 symmetric outcomes in which players are 
coordinated on the same action, 3 symmetric equilibria but only 1 “best” equilibrium.   
Phase 2 of EXP is a short-cut to majority voting in which all participants 
simultaneously vote for a price from 1 to 30 and the median choice is implemented for the 
entire group. Thus, majority voting by definition induces coordinated actions in the sense that 
all play the same action but the median voter’s choices may fall on a disequilibrium outcome 
                                                 
6
  In treatment NH of FT, subjects received written instructions explaining how to calculate real payoffs 
from nominal payoffs. At the end of each period, players are informed about the implemented prices and 
their real payoffs i. 
7
  FT devised the game as a test-bed to study the effects of money illusion on coordination failure. They do 
not claim that their game captures common features of oligopolistic pricing. For example, multiple 
equilibria do not necessarily occur in pricing games and, if they do, a low-price equilibrium does not 
necessarily pareto-dominate other equilibria. However, the authors note that such a situation is possible in 
principle. 
8
  See Heinemann, Nagel and Ockenfels (2009) for an approach to measure strategic uncertainty. 
or on an inferior equilibrium. The purpose of introducing collective action in phase 2 is 
twofold: first, voting provides an opportunity to escape lock-in on an inferior equilibrium if it 
occurred and second, voting serves as a coordination device if no coordination occurred 
because collective action induces all group members to set the same price by definition. Thus, 
majority voting potentially eliminates coordination failure if voters are aware that they are 
“trapped” in an inferior equilibrium. In addition, collective action allows a group to 
coordinate on a superior equilibrium even if some players (a minority) is not aware of its 
existence. 
Phase 3 of EXP is the same as phase 1 except that the game is now only played for 9 
rather than 30 periods. Phase 3 serves to evaluate if successful collective action fosters 
coordination when the game is again played in a decentralized manner by setting a precedent, 
i.e. by coordinating expectations. To test, we compare coordination before and after the vote. 
Figure 1: Average group prices in decentralized play and in collective action for 














Figure 1 shows the main results for EXP. Six groups start out at average prices 
considerably above PB = 10, 1 group just below. The group that starts below PB almost 
instantaneously converges to the pareto-superior equilibrium A. Of the 3 groups starting 
above PB, 3 groups converge rather quickly and 1 group rather slowly to the inferior 
equilibrium C. The thin dotted line shows average prices for a group that started above PB 
and converged towards C for the first 6 periods but then converged to A and finally 
coordinated on A in the last period before the vote. The thick dotted line in figure 1 shows a 
group that started at prices above PB, first converged to C up to period 13, then to A for the 
next 13 periods, then again to C for the next 4 periods, and has a disequilibrium average price 
of 15.6 in the last period before the vote. Thus, in the period before the vote, 4 out of 7 
groups are coordinated on the inefficient equilibrium C with C = 21, 2 groups are 
coordinated on the dominant equilibrium A with A = 28, and 1 group is uncoordinated 
(average payoff over all groups is 20).  
Best-reply dynamics or ficticious play induce convergence to the pareto-dominant 
equilibrium A if the average price happens to be below the unstable equilibrium B in the first 
period, but to the pareto-dominated equilibrium C if the group happens to start out at prices 
above B. The logic of the convergence process appears to be similar to what has been 
observed in the “continental divide game” (Van Huyck, Battalio and Cook 1997). In this 




In study 1, equilibria A and C are stable while B is unstable. Once players coordinate 
on equilibrium C, groups are “trapped” because small unilateral deviations from equilibrium 
action pC do not provide incentives for others – even if they are aware of coordination failure 
– to move away from equilibrium C. The question is thus if the introduction of the majority 
vote in period 31 of EXP served to break lock-in. We find that collective action had 
essentially no impact.  
                                                 
9
  However, note that one group which eventually coordinated on equilibrium A in figure 1 started out at a price 
of above PB. Thus, best-reply dynamics are not the full story behind the convergence process. See also Feri, 
Irlenbusch and Sutter (2009) for a replication in which either 5 individuals or 5 groups of 3 players play the 
game. In the teams treatment, individuals communicate in free form via electronic chat are requested to 
somehow unanimously agree on a joint action (no formal procedure is imposed). The authors find that groups 
who communicate in free form and agree earn significantly higher (22.5 percent) payoffs on average than 
individuals who do not communicate. However, coordination failure looms large both conditions. “Perfect 
coordination”, i.e. all players choosing the same equilibrium is only reached in 4 percent of the periods in 
either case. In a replication of the weakest link game with 7 pareto-rankable equilibria of van Huyck et al 
(1990), the authors let teams first communicate and then vote (median vote) or randomly assign one member 
in each group to be the dictator. They do not find that voting or the random dictator procedure improves 
coordination or increases payoffs. 
All groups that coordinated on some equilibrium before the vote selected the same 
equilibrium through collective action. In particular, the 4 groups that coordinated on 
equilibrium C did not “jump out of the trap” but remained in the dominated equilibrium C. 
We do see some attempts to break lock-in in these groups. In fact, 5 voters who played pC = 
27 in period 30, vote for A in period 31. But since these voters are dispersed across different 
groups, they have no impact on the outcome of the vote. Thus, collective action was 
unsuccessful in breaking lock-in. On the other hand, it is comforting to note that collective 
action was not a disequilibrating force or otherwise counterproductive either. The 2 groups 
that successfully coordinated on A before the vote remained in A.  
In the uncoordinated group (see thick dotted line in figure 1) one voter opts for A, one 
for C but 3 voters opt for a high disequilibrium price of 29. As a result, the collective choice 
(the median vote) was for a disequilibrium price of 29 in this group. Interestingly, the 
collective action does not serve as a “precedent” in this case. That is, the vote does not 
coordinate the group’s expectations or actions in the period following the vote. Instead, the 
group just continues on the convergence path towards equilibrium C and eventually (by 
period 40) coordinates on C. Overall, behavior in the decentralized pricing game in the period 
before and after the vote is not significantly different (p = 0.481, Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
henceforth WSR).  
In EXP, we essentially replicate FT’s finding of massive coordination failure and in 
particular the tendency of groups to coordinate on the equilibrium C which “looks” attractive 
judging by nominal payoffs ( C > A) but which is dominated by A in terms of real payoffs 
( A > C). FT find that groups that coordinate on C tend to remain locked-in in decentralized 
play. FT speculate that strategic properties may inhibit learning to overcome coordination 
failure, perhaps because players, once they are locked-in, search the vast payoff table only 
locally for optimal solutions. We surprisingly find that majority voting does not induce any of 
the “trapped” groups to “jump” to the superior equilibrium A. We thus provide support for 
FT’s conjecture that strategic properties may prevent learning. Interestingly, there seems to 
have been a reverse “precedent” effect in the sense that voting was for the equilibrium that 
players coordinated on in decentralized play.  
2.2. Voting ex ante to select the superior equilibrium (treatment INEXP) 
Treatment INEXP is the same as EXP but reverses the sequence of phases 1 and 2 of 
EXP. In phase 1 of INEXP, the median voter determines the price on which the group 
coordinates in period 1. Phase 2 consists of 29 periods of the price setting game in a 
decentralized manner as in phase 1 of EXP. The purpose of introducing majority voting in 
period 1 is to test if collective action prevents coordination failure by selecting the superior 
equilibrium A from the start. Thus, if collective action in period 1 succeeds in selecting 
equilibrium A and serves as a “precedent”, we should see more successful coordination in 
phase 2 of INEXP than in phase 1 of EXP. However, that is not case. 
Figure 2:  Average group prices in collective action for inexperienced voters and 
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Figure 2 shows average group prices in INEXP over time. The main finding is that 
collective action by inexperienced voters fails to coordinate behavior on the superior 
equilibrium A. The dots in figure 2 show the median vote for each of the 4 groups, and we 
see that none of the groups is coordinated on PA = 4. Only 25 percent of subjects vote pA = 4, 
5 percent for pB = 10, and 0 percent vote pC = 27. A full 70 percent of subjects vote for 
disequilibrium prices. Choices are not different in EXP and INEXP in period 1 (16.6 in both 
treatments, p = 0.83, MW).  None of the groups coordinates on any equilibrium and while 
efficiency is higher in the presence than in the absence of collective action (8.9 in INEXP, 1.7 
in period 1 of EXP, p =0.01) it remains low (31.8 percent of  A). The massive coordination 
failure in period 1 of INEXP thus does not seem to be due to strategic uncertainty or failed 
equilibrium selection but rather to disequilibrium choices. We speculate that wide-spread 
disequilibrium play (in EXP) and voting (in INEXP) in period 1 is due to subjects’ cognitive 
inability to identify any equilibrium. In line with FT, we speculate that this is due to the effect 
of the nominal representation (i.e. money illusion), and perhaps magnified by the large action 
space.  
When comparing overall efficiency in the periods with decentralized play (periods 1-30 
in EXP, 2-30 in INEXP), we find no difference (16.4 vs. 15.3, p = 0.36, MW). Thus, 
collective action in period 1 does not improve the efficiency of coordination in the 
consecutive decentralized game. Given that collective action failed to select any equilibrium, 
it is perhaps not surprising to note that collective action did not serve as a coordinating 
“precedent”. When comparing voting of experienced (EXP in period 31) and inexperienced 
voters (INEXP in period 1), we note that votes in EXP are more often (71 percent) for 
equilibrium values than in INEXP (30 percent). The share of votes for A is similar in both 
treatments (25 vs. 37 percent), but the share of votes for C is higher in EXP (34 vs. 0 
percent). Thus, extensive experience with playing the coordination game in a decentralized 
manner does not improve the coordinating effect of collective action.   
A potential reason for the failure of majority voting to prevent (in INEXP) or break 
lock-in (in EXP) is that incentives for strategic voting are present for particular 
disequilibrium beliefs. To illustrate, assume that player i expects 2 of the other players to vote 
C and two to vote for a price between A and C. Given these beliefs, it is rational for player i 
to vote C to prevent the median to be between A and C implying a low disequilibrium payoff 
compared to C. As a consequence, majority voting may provide incentives not to vote for A 
if expectations are not coordinated. In other words, collective action in the guise of majority 
voting does not eliminate strategic uncertainty and this fact may partly explain it lack of 
success in improving coordination. 
 
3. Does collective action coordinate expectations by “precedent”? -- Study 2 
The purpose of study 2 is to test the coordinating effect of collective action by 
setting a “precedent”. The idea is to see if successful equilibrium selection through 
collective action improves coordination in subsequent decentralized play by coordinating 
expectations. To test, we need a setup in which collective action is expected to be 
successful in selecting the efficient equilibrium in the first place. We make two 
modifications from study 1 to improve the effectiveness of collective action in equilibrium 
selection.  
First, we reduce the action space to include only the 3 equilibrium actions. Thus, 
complexity of the payoff table is reduced which can be expected to reduces the potential 
for mis-coordination (see Ho and Weigelt 1996, Devetag and Ortmann 2007). Second, we 
introduce collective action in the guise of random dictator voting rather than majority 
voting as in study 1. Random dictator voting has the advantage of eliminating any strategic 
incentive not to vote A. Because of the reduced action space, all outcomes of collective 
action are equilibrium outcomes. The equilibrium selection problem is non-strategic since 
it is optimal to vote equilibrium A no matter what equilibrium other players vote. Except 
for these two changes, study 2 has the same parameters and procedures as study 1. 
 
3.1. Design of study 2 
Table 1 summarizes the design of study 2. Treatment NoVote has no collective 
action and the game is therefore played in a decentralized manner in all periods. That is, 
coordination can fail in NoVote because players pick different actions (are mis-
coordinated) or because they coordinate on an inferior equilibrium. In decentralized play, 
we therefore expect coordination failure to loom large. 
Treatment RepeatVote is the same as NoVote except that collective action in the 
guise of random dictator voting is introduced in period 1 when players are inexperienced, 
and in periods 11 and 21 when players are experienced. In these 3 periods, all players 
simultaneously vote for a price between 1 and 30 and the choice of one player is randomly 
determined to be implemented for the entire group.  
 
Table 1: Experimental design of study 2 
Treatment 
 
Description Source of Coordination failure 
 
NoVote 
49 players  
in 10 groups  
 
 
Decentralized action  
in all 30 periods 
(with strategic uncertainty) 
 
 
Players do not choose the same action 
(are mis-coordinated)  




40 players  
in 8 groups  
 
 
Collective action  
in periods 1, 11, 21 
Decentralized action  
in periods 2-10, 12-20, 22-30 
 
 
As in AllVote 
 
As in NoVote 
 
AllVote 
23 players  
in 5 groups  
 
 
Collective action  
in all 30 periods 
(no strategic uncertainty) 
 
Groups coordinate on inferior 
equilibrium 
(note: players are coordinated on some 
equilibrium by design) 
 
We expect collective action to improve coordination in study 2 compared to study 1 
for 2 reasons. First, because of the reduced action space (see table 2), voting in study 2 
coordinates actions on the same equilibrium action, rather than just the same action as in 
study 1, by definition. The players’ problem in study 2 is therefore reduced to equilibrium 
selection in periods with collective action. Second, voters are more likely to select 
equilibrium A because it is dominant for a rational and self-interested player i to vote for 
A, independent of i's belief about voting by -i. Thus, in random dictator voting, unlike 
majority voting, any strategic incentive not to vote for A is absent in collective action. For 
the same reason we also expect collective action to improve efficiency compared to 
decentralized play in NoVote.   
In RepeatVote, the game is played in a decentralized manner in periods 2-10, 12-20, 
and 22-30, exactly as in NoVote. In these periods, players face both aspects of the 
coordination problem, i.e. to pick the same and to pick the best equilibrium. Both of these 
problems involve strategic uncertainty in decentralized play. The purpose of collective 
action in RepeatVote is thus not only to test if collective action succeeds in selecting the 
efficient equilibrium A but also to test if it coordinates expectations in the decentralized 
game played after the vote by setting a “precedent”. 
Treatment AllVote is the same as RepeatVote except that voting takes place in all 
periods rather than only in 3 periods. In AllVote, outcomes are coordinated on one of the 3 
equilibria by design and the coordination problem is reduced to a non-strategic equilibrium 
selection problem. Treatments AllVote and NoVote thus provide the benchmarks against 
which we evaluate the coordinating effect of collective action in RepeatVote. 
Table 2: Payoff table for study 2 (note: table shows nominal payoffs) 
 Average price of other firms  
Your 
price 
4 10 27  
4 112 11 28  
10 7 50 29  
27 4 10 567  
 
Table 2 shows the payoff table used in all treatments and periods of study 2. As in 
study 1, the table shows nominal payoffs. While study 1 uses a payoff table with 30 
actions (i.e. a 30 x 30 table, see Appendix C1), we reduce the action space to a 3 x 3 
matrix in study 2 by eliminating all non-equilibrium actions. Absent collective action, this 
elimination facilitates coordination on the same action (since there are only 3 rather than 
30 options), as well as coordination on an equilibrium (since all coordinated actions now 
result in equilibrium outcomes). The elimination of non-equilibrium actions has 
implications for the stability of equilibria in decentralized play. In study 2, equilibria A 
and C are unstable while equilibrium B is now stable in the sense that a deviation of one 
player from B does not provide incentives for others to deviate from equilibrium B.
10
 
While equilibrium B had the “watershed” (or separatrix) property in study 1, this property 
is in study 2 in some sense reversed to a strongly attractive equilibrium. Equilibrium B is 
quite robust since pB is a best reply to about 80%
11
 admissible beliefs, whereas the other 
two equilibria are fragile in the sense that unilateral deviations have large effects on the 
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 More specifically, if n-2 players choose action pB and player i chooses pA or pC, player j has an incentive to 
choose pB. As a consequence, each of the n-2 players’ best replies is pB. 
11
 Table A1 in the appendix shows the best-replies given all possible beliefs in a group of n = 5 players. In this 
case, there are 81 admissible beliefs. In 67 of these cases, pB = 10 is a best reply (including 6 cases with 
multiple best replies). 
best-reply dynamics.
12
 Since equilibrium B has a rather low real payoff of B = 5, we 
expect coordination in decentralized play to be rather inefficient which also means that 
collective action has a high potential to improve efficiency. 
3.2. Results of study 2 
In treatment NoVote coordination failure looms large in the early periods. While 
coordination improves with experience, it is far from perfect even after 30 periods. More 
specifically, efficiency, defined as the sum of payoffs relative to payoff in equilibrium A, 
is below 20 percent in the first 4 periods, increases to around 40 percent and remains at 
that level until period 20. In the last 10 periods, efficiency stabilizes at a level of about 60 
percent (see figure 3). Average efficiency over all periods of NoVote is 43.7 percent.  
We evaluate coordination failure in NoVote at the individual and at the group level. 
At the individual level, coordination failure prevails if (i) players do not receive any 
equilibrium payoff (they are uncoordinated) or (ii) if players do not receive the pareto-
dominant equilibrium payoff A (they select an inferior equilibrium). At the group level, 
coordination failure prevails if (iii) a group (i.e. at least one of its members) is not 
coordinated on an equilibrium or (iv) if the group is not coordinated on the pareto-
dominant equilibrium A. Note that coordination may fail in all four senses in decentralized 




According to these four measures, coordination in NoVote is far from perfect, to say 
the least. In period 1 of NoVote, 73 percent of players receive a non-equilibrium payoff 
and not a single player (0 percent) receives A (see first two columns of table 3). At the 
group level, coordination failure is total in period 1 of NoVote, in the sense that none of 
the 10 groups are coordinated on any equilibrium. Coordination improves over time in the 
sense that players coordinate on some equilibrium but coordination failure still looms large 
as they do not predominantly coordinate on the pareto-superior equilibrium A. For 
example, in period 11, 29 percent of players receive disequilibrium payoffs and only 35 
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 In addition to the 3 pure-strategy equilibria, there is a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which players 
choose prices pA, pB, and pC with probabilities 0.11, 0.74, and 0.15, respectively. The expected payoff in the 
mixed strategy equilibrium is 9.9, resulting in an efficiency of 35.4 per cent (relative to equilibrium payoffs in 
A). 
13
 Also note that the minimum payoffs are higher by design in periods with collective action (i.e. periods 1, 11, 
21 of RepeatVote and in all periods of AllVote) because voting eliminates mis-coordination.  
percent receive payoff A. Only 2 groups are coordinated on A while the other 8 groups 
are uncoordinated in period 11 of decentralized play. In period 21, still 22 percent of 
players receive disequilibrium payoffs and only 43 percent receive A. Even now only 3 
groups are coordinated on A and 2 groups on B, while the other 5 groups are still 
uncoordinated. We conclude that coordination failure looms large in treatment NoVote 
and that our game therefore creates ideal preconditions for investigating if collective 
action improves coordination. 
Table 3: Percentage of players receiving disequilibrium and equilibrium payoffs 
 





Period Diseq. A B C Diseq. A B C A B C 
1 73 0 27 0 -- 25 13 63 0 39 61 
2-10 43 23 35 0 32 14 6 47 72 0 28 
11 29 35 37 0 -- 50 13 38 61 0 39 
12-20 15 33 52 0 22 28 5 45 87 2 11 
21 22 43 35 0 -- 88 0 13 100 0 0 
22-30 10 49 33 9 23 44 4 28 88 2 10 
 
Treatment AllVote provides the benchmark to evaluate RepeatVote at the opposite 
end of the spectrum since choices are now made collectively in all periods. In AllVote, 
coordination failure is a priori less likely to occur because coordination is only a matter of 
non-strategic equilibrium selection. In fact, average efficiency over all periods in AllVote 
is about the double of NoVote (93.4 vs. 43.7 percent) and we observe that efficiency 
remains between 90 and 100 percent throughout the game with few exceptions (see fine 
dotted line in figure 3). Efficiency is higher in AllVote than in NoVote already in the first 
period (14.7 vs. 2.1, p = 0.000, MW), for all periods (p = 0.000, MW) and the last 10 
periods jointly (p = 0.022, MW), but not in the very last period (p = 0.211, MW). 
Surprisingly, coordination is imperfect in period 1 of AllVote since 0 groups are 
coordinated in A, 2 in B and 3 in C. Thus, collective action does not prevent coordination 
failure even in the game with a much reduced scope for coordination failure. But 
coordination rapidly improves in AllVote. For example, In period 11, 3 groups are 
coordinated in A and 2 groups in C, and in period 21 coordination is perfect since all 5 
groups are coordinated in A. Thus, comparing NoVote and AllVote suggests that this type 
of collective action is not successful in preventing, but quite successful in eliminating 
coordination failure after players have gained some experience.   
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In RepeatVote, periods 1, 11 and 21 are with collective action (see dots in the bold-
faced graph of figure 3) as in AllVote, while in all other periods, the game is played in a 
decentralized manner as in NoVote. The comparison of period 1 in RepeatVote and 
NoVote shows that collective action improved efficiency substantially for inexperienced 
voters. Figure 3 shows that efficiency in period 1 with collective action was 74 percent 
with collective action but only 8 percent without (p = 0.000, MW). While average 
efficiency was high in period 1 of RepeatVote, equilibrium selection is rather imperfect. 
For example, only 2 groups (with 25 percent of all players) coordinate on equilibrium A, 
while 1 and 5 groups cordinate on equilibrium B and C, respectively. Thus, we conclude, 
as we did in the discussion of AllVote, that collective action does not prevent coordination 
failure altogether in the sense that voters fail to select the superior equilibrium even in the 
reduced game.  
Remarkably, collective action has only a modest effect on efficiency by setting a 
“precedent” in periods 2 to 9, i.e. when RepeatVote is played in the same way as NoVote. 
That is, the relatively successful coordination of actions through collective action in period 
1 of RepeatVote was only partly successful in coordinating expectations in subsequent 
decentralized play of the game (see Hamman et al. 2007 for the limited effect of 
precedents through collective monetary rewards and punishments in minimum effort 
games). Efficiency falls from 74 percent in period 1 to 29 percent in period 2 of 
RepeatVote. Average efficiency in RepeatVote develops along a similar path in periods 2 
to 9 as in NoVote but is at a higher level in RepeatVote (p = 0.000, MW). In period 2 of 
RepeatVote, only 2 groups that were coordinated in period 1 on C manage to remain 
coordinated, all other groups discoordinate. That is particularly surprising for the 2 groups 
that were coordinated on equilibrium A.  
In the second vote of RepeatVote (see dot in period 11) efficiency jumps up (from 
62 percent in period 10 to 80 percent in period 11; p = 0.006 Wilcoxon Sign Rank test, 
henceforth WSR). In period 11, 4 groups are coordinated on A, 1 on B, 3 on C. Average 
efficiency with collective action is again higher than without (compare RepeatVote and 
NoVote in period 11, p = 0.000 MW). However, the second instance of collective action 
had no lasting impact on decentralized play as the average efficiency in the 4 periods after 
the second vote is the same as the average in the 4 periods before (0.65 vs. 0.63, p = 0.781 
WSR). In period 12, the same 2 groups that were coordinated in period 2 manage to 
coordinate on equilibrium C plus one group manages to remain coordinated on A. The 
other 3 groups that were coordinated by collective action in period 11 on A, 1 player 
deviates each. We conclude that the “precedent” effect of the second instance of collective 
action is rather weak.  
The pattern repeats itself for the third vote. Again, voting in itself improved 
efficiency (97 percent in RepeatVote vs. 50 percent in NoVote of period 21, p = 0.000, 
MW), but average efficiency in the decentralized game is not different in period 22 to 30 
across RepeatVote and NoVote (p = 0.993 MW). In period 21 we find that collective 
action coordinates 7 groups on the efficient equilibrium A and 1 on C. Yet, in period 22 
with decentralized play, only 3 of the 7 groups that coordinated on A remain coordinated. 
A comparison of RepeatVote and AllVote yields the following. In period 1, when 
participants are inexperienced, we find that average efficiency is different (p = 0.002, 
MW), but the distributions of payoffs are not different between RepeatVote and AllVote 
(p = 0.177 according to a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test which corrects for ties, 
henceforth KS). Averages and distributions are not different across AllVote and 
RepeatVote in period 11 (p = 0.243 MW, p = 0.958 KS) and period 21 (p = 0.080 MW, p 
= 0.958 KS) at the 5 percent level. However, AllVote has significantly higher efficiency 
when compared to the periods with decentralized decision making in RepeatVote in 
periods 2 to 10, 12 to 20 (p = 0.000 MW each), and significantly different distributions (p 
= 0.000 KS each for periods 2 to 10, 12 to 20, and 22 to 30). 
We conclude that collective action is efficiency-increasing because it successfully 
coordinates actions but it does not perfectly solve the equilibrium selection problem, nor 
does it eliminate coordination failure in the decentralized game by setting an efficient 
precedent. We believe that the reason for this failure to persistently eliminate coordination 
failure is due to uncoordinated expectations.  
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Figure 4 shows the distribution of expectations on P-i , i.e. the average price chosen 
by of other firms, in the periods following the three votes in RepeatVote (see black bars). 
The grey bars show the distribution of expectations in NoVote for comparison. In period 2, 
the percentage of players expecting equilibrium A to prevail is very similar in the two 
treatments (25 vs. 20 percent). But expectations for equilibrium B (23 vs. 63 percent) and 
C (53 vs. 16 percent) are clearly different. Voting in period 1 of RepeatVote therefore 
seems to systematically have affected the level (p = 0.030, MW) and the distribution of 
expectations (p = 0.001, KS) but does no induce assurance that A will be played. A similar 
conclusion holds for the period after the second vote in RepeatVote (period 12). 
Participants do not expect equilibrium A to prevail at different rates (38 vs. 43 percent), 
but differences are pronounced for B and C. Again, the level (p = 0.001 MW) and the 
distribution (p = 0.014 KS) of expectations are different between NoVote and RepeatVote. 
The same pattern is also present after the third vote (period 22) but in this period, neither 
the overall level (p = 0.296 MW) nor the distribution of expectations (p = 0.272 KS) is 
different. Figure 4 also illustrates that collective action only very gradually coordinates 
expectations on the superior equilibrium A. The percentage of players expecting others on 
average to choose A increases from 25 percent in period 2 to 38 percent in period 12 to 
reach 73 percent in period 22. 
In conclusion, it seems fair to say that collective action in one period helped 
reducing the prevalence of beliefs in the equilibrium B with particularly low efficiency (a 
belief which prevails if i expects the group to be coordinated on B or to be uncoordinated) 
in the subsequent period of decentralized play. However, voting did not increase beliefs in 
the efficient equilibrium A but, perhaps surprisingly, it did increase beliefs in equilibrium 
C. We therefore conclude that money illusion affected collective action to a remarkable 
extent. Thirteen percent of players vote in line with money illusion in period 21 of 
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 While the present paper is mainly concerned with investigating collective action as a cure for coordination 
failure rather than with what aspect of money illusion causes coordination failure, we still wanted to test if 
money illusion is also a cause in the simplified game of study 2 (we already know from Fehr and Tyran 2007 
that it is a cause of coordination failure in study 1). To test, we ran a control treatment of NoVote (n = 21) in a 
real representation. We find that the effect of money illusion is strong, even in this simple game. Average 
payoffs over all periods in the real representation NoVote are roughly twice the payoffs in the nominal 
representation (24.2 vs. 12.2, p = 0.000, MW). The effect of money illusion is already pronounced in the first 
period, i.e. before players get feedback from other payers’ choices (19.1 in real vs. 2.1 in nominal, p = 0.000, 
MW). The effect is persistent. It remains strong and significant up to the very last period of the game (28.0 in 
real vs. 17.5 nominal, p = 0.000, MW).  
5. Concluding remarks 
This paper has provided evidence that collective action may not be as successful in 
improving coordination as common intuition suggests. The evidence is clear and 
systematic and comes from games in which coordination failure looms large in 
decentralized play because at least some players are confused about the real payoffs and, 
therefore, about the pareto-ranking of equilibria. This confusion introduces additional 
strategic uncertainty into the game. One possible reason why collective action in the guise 
of majority voting in study 1 has only weak effects on coordination is that majority voting 
does not totally eliminate strategic uncertainty. In contrast, we have seen that collective 
action is rather effective in the guise of random dictator voting in which strategic 
uncertainty is totally eliminated. Thus, this difference between the two modes of collective 
action is a candidate explanation for the differential effectiveness of collective action in 
improving coordination. However, it is difficult to assess to what extent strategic 
uncertainty can be held responsible for these differences from comparing study 1 and 2 
because these studies have not been designed for direct comparison. As a consequence, 
they differ by more than one aspect. 
While we believe that our demonstration of the ineffectiveness of collective action to 
improve coordination is surprising and convincing, we would like to caution the reader 
from extrapolating our findings to other types of coordination games. One reason is that 
the present study is one of the first to study the effects on collective action in the literature, 
and little is therefore known about this potential institutional remedy against coordination 
failure in general. Another reason is that the game we have studied exhibits massive 
coordination failure in decentralized play. We believe that our choice of the game is 
appropriate from a methodological perspective because it provides a convenient workhorse 
and an almost ideal test-bed to study potential effects of collective action. However, we 
also know – from an extensive literature in experimental economics – that players’ ability 
to coordinate can depend on a myriad of game-, presentation- and protocol-specific factors 
(see the contributions on coordination games in the special issue of Experimental 
Economics in 2007 or Devetag and Ortmann 2007 for a discussion). Accordingly, games 
with slightly different characteristics can be constructed in which coordination is much 
more efficient than in the games studied here (For example, coordination failure occurs at 
a much lower rate if the games used in studies 1 and 2 are played showing real, rather than 
nominal payoffs. More generally, subtle differences in payoffs can have a large effect on 
how the game is played, see Crawford, Gneezy, Rottenstreich 2008).  
While alternative institutional remedies for coordination failure like financial 
incentives (e.g. Brands and Cooper 2006, Hamman, Rick and Weber 2007), and in 
particular pre-play communication have extensively been studied and shown to be 
effective in many cases (e.g. Charness 2000, Duffy and Feltovich 2002, Blume and 
Ortmann 2007), we believe that the role of collective action and coordination is under-
researched. We therefore hope that our paper motivates further research on collective 
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Table A1: Best-replies for all possible expectations (illustration for groups of n = 5) 
Expectations Average Best Reply 
(4,4,4,4) 4 4 
(4,4,4,10) 5.5 4 
(4,4,10,10) 7 10 
(4,10,10,10) 8.5 10 
(4,4,4,27) 9.75 10 
(10,10,10,10) 10 10 
(4,4,10,27) 11.25 10 
(4,10,10,27) 12.75 10 
(10,10,10,27) 14.25 10 
(27,27,4,4) 15.5 10 
(4,10,27,27) 17 10 
(10,10,27,27) 18.5 10 
(4,27,27,27) 21.25 27 
(10,27,27,27) 22.75 27 
(27,27,27,27) 27 27 
 
Appendix B: Instructions  
[Common part for all treatments] 
Welcome to the experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. When you read these 
instructions carefully, you can earn money. During the experiment, we calculate your 
income in points. All points you earn during the experiment will be converted into Danish 
Kroner according to the exchange rate:  
10 points = 1.50 Kroner 
Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. Please raise 
your hand if you have any questions. 
This experiment has several phases. The first phase has 10 periods. We explain the details 
of phase 1 now, the details of the other phases are explained later.  
All participants are randomly assigned to groups. The size of your group will be displayed 
on the screen. You do not know who is in your group but the group remains the same 
throughout the experiment. Only the decisions in your group are relevant for your 
earnings. Decisions by other groups are irrelevant to you.  
 
[Treatment AllVote:] 
All group members are in the role of firms. In each period, all firms must simultaneously 
choose a price of 4, 10 or 27. After all firms have made their choices, one firm from the 
group is chosen at random. The price chosen by this firm is implemented for all firms. 
Therefore, the price and the average price of others is the same for all firms. How much a 
firm earns depends on the price implemented and on the average price of the other firms in 
the group. Thus, the earnings are depends on the choice of one single firm. 
 
[Treatment NoVote:] 
All group members are in the role of firms. In each period, all firms must simultaneously 
choose a price of 4, 10 or 27. How much a firm earns depends on the price it chooses and 
on the average price of the other firms in the group. Note that the resulting average is 
rounded to the nearest of 4, 10 or 27. Therefore the average price relevant for determining 
your income can only be 4, 10 or 27. 
 
[Treatment RepeatVote:] 
All group members are in the role of firms. In each period, all firms must simultaneously 
choose a price of 4, 10 or 27. How much a firm earns depends on the price it chooses and 
on the average price of the other firms in the group. Note that the resulting average is 
rounded to the nearest of 4, 10 or 27. Therefore the average price relevant for your income 
calculation can only be 4, 10 or 27. These rules apply to periods 2 to 10. 
 
[All  Treatments:] 
How your income is calculated 
The income table (on the next page) shows your nominal point income. All firms have the 
same tables. To illustrate how you read the table, consider the following example. 
Example: Suppose you choose a price of 10 and the other firms choose prices of 10 on 
average. In this case, your nominal point income is 50 points.  
For the determination of your earnings, only the real point income is relevant. This 
holds for all firms. To calculate your real point income from your nominal point income, 
you have to divide the nominal point income by the average price of other firms. 
Therefore, the nominal and the real point income are related as follows:  
 
firmsother  of price Average
incomepoint  Nominal
  incomepoint  Real  
 
[Treatment NoVote and RepeatVote] 
If the resulting real point income is a non-integer, it is rounded to the closest whole 
number. In the example above, your nominal point income is 50 points, but your real point 
income is 5 points, since: 50 points / 10 = 5. 
 
[Treatment AllVote ] 
To summarize: at the beginning of each period, you choose a price. Then, a random 
member of the group will be chosen, and his/her price is implemented for all. At the end of 
each period, you learn the average price of the others and your real income in this period.  
 
[Treatment NoVote ] 
To summarize: at the beginning of each period, you choose a price. In addition, you 
indicate what average price of the other group members you expect. The choices by all 
firms determine the average price of other firms. The average price of other firms is 
rounded to the nearest of the three possible prices: 4, 10 and 27. At the end of each period, 
you learn the average price of the others and your real income in this period. 
 
[Treatment RepeatVote ] 
To summarize: at the beginning of each period, you choose a price. In addition, you 
indicate what average price of the other group members you expect. In the first period, a 
random member of the group will be chosen, and his/her price is implemented for all. In 
the remaining 9 periods, the choices by all firms determine the average price of other 
firms. The average price of other firms is rounded to the nearest of the three possible 
prices: 4, 10 and 27. At the end of each period, you learn the average price of the others 
and your real income in this period. 
 
[All treatments:] 
You may write on these instructions and the table. Do you have any questions? 
 
Income Table 
 Average price of other firms 
 4 10 27 
Your 
price 
   
4 112 11 28 
10 7 50 29 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We study whether a sunspot can lead to either coordination on an inferior equilibrium (mis-
coordination) or to out-of equilibrium behavior (dis-coordination) in a coordination game with 
Pareto-ranked equilibria. While much of the literature searches for mechanisms to attain 
coordination on the efficient equilibrium, we consider sunspots as a potential reason for 
coordination failure. We conducted an experiment with a three player 2x2x2 game in which 
coordination on the efficient equilibrium is easy and should normally occur. In the control 
session, there was almost perfect coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, but in the 
sunspot treatment, dis-coordination was frequent. Sunspots lead to significant inefficiency, and 
we conclude that sunspots indeed can cause coordination failure. 
 
Julie Beugnot Zeynep Gürgüç Frederik R. Øvlisen Michael W.M. Roos 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to study experimentally whether a sunspot can lead to 
coordination failure, i.e. either coordination on an inferior equilibrium (mis-coordination) or 
to out-of equilibrium behavior (dis-coordination) in a coordination game with Pareto-ranked 
equilibria. Following the definition of Duffy and Fisher (2005) we think of a sunspot being 
an extrinsic random variable that does not directly affect economic fundamentals. While 
much of the relevant literature searches for mechanisms to attain coordination on the 
efficient equilibrium (e.g. Bornstein et al. 2002, Weber 2006, Brandts and Cooper 2006, 
Brandts et al. 2007), we focus on potential reasons for coordination failure. Is it possible that 
in a game in which coordination on the efficient equilibrium is easy and should normally 
occur, a sunspot can prevent subjects from coordinating on any equilibrium or even make 
them coordinate on an inferior equilibrium? If so, sunspots can explain coordination failures 
or collective choices of dominated equilibria observed in the real world such bank runs, 
stock market crashes or other financial turmoil (see Diamond and Dybvig 1983, Allen and 
Gale 2004, Harrison and Weder 2006).  In addition to those macroeconomic coordination 
problems, coordination is important for large organizations, in which it is necessary to 
synchronize the efforts of individual workers in order to avoid production bottlenecks (see 
Van Huyck et al. 1990, Knez and Camerer 1994). In both cases, rumors or some external 
news could affect the behavior of agents and lead to coordination failure. 
 
Previous work has shown that it is not easy to generate sunspots in the laboratory that affect 
subjects’ behavior (Marimon et al. 1993). Duffy and Fisher (2005) were the first to 
experimentally establish that sunspots may influence economic choices. We modify their 
approach in two important ways. First, we consider Pareto-ranked equilibria whereas their 
model has equilibria which are not Pareto-ranked. Second, we simplify the game and its 
presentation. While Duffy and Fisher generated sunspots in a market setting, we use a simple 
three-player 2x2x2 game, in which coordination on the obvious Pareto-superior equilibrium 
is very easy. Similar to Duffy and Fisher (2005), our sunspot is an announcement determined 
by the roll of a dice. We find that sunspots influence choices and cause coordination failure 
even though the conditions of the experiment are such that we theoretically should not 
expect any effects of the sunspot. We thus show that sunspots can affect economic behavior, 
but also that they can do it in a very significant and welfare-decreasing way.  
  
In the experiment, a sunspot consists of two announcements which correspond with the 
strategies available to subjects. Due to the very suggestive character of our sunspot, our work 
can be related to the literature on recommendation in games (e.g. Brandts and MacLeod 
1995, Cason and Sharma 2007, Kuang et al. 2007) However, our sunspot differs from a 
recommendation because of its obvious random nature. The literature on recommendations 
shows that in some cases subjects follow a recommendation to play a strategy that leads to 
an inferior equilibrium. In other cases, recommendations create uncertainty about whether 
the other players will follow the recommendation which results in dis-coordination. Brandts 
and MacLeod (1995) show that if incentives are strong enough, subjects follow reasonable 
recommendations, but ignore unreasonable ones. In particular, recommendations to play an 
equilibrium that is not subgame-perfect are usually not followed. This is in contrast to our 
finding that subjects follow a sunspot, although it is not in their interest to do so. 
 
Duffy and Fisher (2005) provide evidence that the semantics of the sunspot matters. 
Subjects are more inclined to coordinate on a sunspot, if the sunspot can be interpreted as 
being related to the economic problem. If the sunspot is abstract or difficult to relate to the 
economic problem, subjects seem to ignore it. For that reason we choose to frame our 
experiment as a real-work economic problem rather than using an abstract game. We 
consider workers’ decisions to go on a strike. A strike can be seen as a coordination game, 
because a worker wants to join the others either striking or not striking. If a worker does not 
join his coworkers, he either foregoes benefits of a successful strike or he bears the costs of 
an unsuccessful one. According to Franzosi (1989), it is difficult to explain why strikes occur. 
Perfectly rational and informed workers and managers would negotiate and avoid strikes. 
Hence striking might be a dominated equilibrium in a coordination game and workers’ 
decision to go on strike might be influenced by exogenous signals that either make 
coordination on not striking more difficult or even ease the coordination on striking. 
Kaufman (1982) presents empirical evidence that non-economic attitudinal or psychological 
factors such as the militancy of workers, the charisma of union leaders or public opinion 
towards organized labor have explanatory power for the annual number of strikes or the 
number of workers involved in strikes in the US. Therefore, we believe that such 
psychological motivations for strikes could be influenced by random events. 
  
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
We use a coordination game in which subjects in groups of 3 people are put in the role of 
workers, who choose between the two actions work (W) and strike (S). The effect of sunspots 
is studied in a within-subject design, in which subjects play two different phases of 20 
periods (a total of 40 periods) – one phase without sunspots and one with sunspots. The 
payment depends on performance of all the periods. The sunspot corresponds to an 
announcement which is made at the beginning of a period. There are two possible 
announcements – “work” and “strike”. The realized announcement is determined randomly 
by the roll of a (6-sided) dice. The two possible announcements thus correspond to the 
action space of the workers. In this way it is very clear how the sunspot could be used as a 
coordination device. Given the results in Duffy and Fisher (2005) on the significance of the 
sunspots’ semantics, we do not expect abstract announcements such as “green” and “red” to 
have an effect. The sunspot is determined by pure chance, and it is therefore not a 
recommendation, although it could appear so. Therefore, it should be obvious that choosing 
the action according to the announcement generally cannot be expected to lead to higher 
payoffs. In order to make the random determination of the announcement very salient to 
subjects, one of them rolls the dice herself and the experimenter makes the announcement 
about the number on the dice to the whole group.   
 
The coordination game is very simple and the payoffs are shown in the following table: 
Table 1: Payoff table  
        Other Players’ Decisions in Your Group 
 
If  BOTH of the 
other participants 
choose WORK 
If ONE of the other 
participants chooses 
WORK and the other 
chooses STRIKE 
If BOTH of the 
other participants 
choose STRIKE 
WORK 40 10 10 




 The game has the two pure strategy Nash equilibria (S,S,S) and (W,W,W) which are Pareto-
ranked1. Notice that the payoff-dominant equilibrium (W,W,W) is also risk-dominant2, which 
distinguishes our game from a typical stag-hunt game where the inefficient equilibrium is 
risk-dominant. This ensures that there is no conflict between risk- and payoff dominance. 
Moreover, expected payoff from playing W is higher than the expected payoff from playing 
S. 
 
Under these circumstances, we expect subjects to coordinate easily on (W,W,W) in the 
absence of a contradictory signal as well as in the presence of one. Indeed, even with the 
randomly determined announcement “strike”, conventional theory predicts that rational 
subjects (with common knowledge of rationality) should ignore the signal and coordinate on 
(W,W,W). However, “strike” announcement might create strategic uncertainty if some 
subjects believe that other subjects will follow the announcement. In that case, we will 
observe that at least some subjects choose S instead of W. Potentially, strategic uncertainty 
could be so strong that all subjects coordinate on (S,S,S), whenever they receive the strike 
announcement. This would be a sunspot equilibrium, in which every subject believes the 
other subjects to follow the announcement. By playing the best response to this belief, the 
belief would be self-confirming. 
 
In order to avoid reputation effects, the game is played as a repeated one-shot game with 
random matching. Moreover, we vary the order of the sunspot phase to check for order 
effects. To do this, we run control/sunspot sessions (C/S session hereafter), where subjects 
start by playing a coordination game without announcements in the first 20 periods and play 
a coordination game with the sunspot in the last 20 periods, and sunspot/control sessions 
(S/C session hereafter), where, they start with the sunspot phase and play the pure 
coordination game without announcements after period 20. 
 
                                                 





, respectively. The expected payoff in the mixed strategy equilibrium is 16 
resulting in an efficiency of 40 per cent (relative to equilibrium payoffs in (W,W,W)). 
 
2 As the product of the deviation losses for W,W,W is the highest (Harsanyi and Selten (1988)). 
 We use two devices in order to avoid that the sunspot destroys the expected coordination on 
the superior equilibrium. The first one consists of choosing a low probability of the “work” 
announcement. Actually, if the “strike” announcement occurs frequently, subjects have 
many opportunities to observe the behavior of the other players and to learn that 
coordination failure is costly. Hence, we announce “work” only if the dice shows 1 and 
“strike” otherwise. With the same rationale, the second device consists of providing the 
subjects with the complete history of the game. After each period subjects are informed 
about their own decision, the decisions of the other players in the group, the earned points 
and the announcement, if there was one. Displaying this information for all past periods 
should also facilitate learning and coordination on the superior equilibrium.  
 
The sessions for this experiment were conducted in LEEX at Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
(UPF) and in LEE at University of Copenhagen (CPH), using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). 
36 undergraduate students from various departments of UPF and 48 students from various 
departments of CPH participated in this experiment. After receiving the instructions3, 
participants answered control questions to check their understanding of the game at hand at 
the beginning and filled in a questionnaire to collect their comments at the end of each 
session. As mentioned above, each session consisted of two different treatments, one with 
announcement (the sunspot treatment) and another without announcement (the control 
treatment). In the sunspot treatments, the throw of a dice was used in order to determine 
which announcement was realized. At the beginning of each period subjects were randomly 
matched with others and the dice was rolled by one of the participants. Next, the number on 
the dice was announced out loud. Finally, according to the number on the dice that was 
stated, subject received announcements of “work” or “strike” on their computer screen. All 
the subjects knew that they received the same announcement which was determined 
according to the roll of the dice. In order to get more independent observations from each 
treatment, we divided participants in each treatment into subgroups of 6 people, and the 
subjects from each subgroup were randomly matched with each other for the remaining 
periods. All participants were paid a show-up fee of 3 € (20 Danish kroner (DKK)) and 
moreover, received 1 € per 150 points (15 DKK per 150 points) at the end of the 
                                                 
3 See appendix 
 experiment. All the subjects were paid in cash at the end of each session and the average 
earnings were €15 in Barcelona and €16 in Copenhagen.  
 
3. RESULTS 
We begin this section with an analysis of the control treatments of both sessions. Firstly, we 
will see that without sunspots subjects coordinate on the Pareto efficient equilibrium. 
Afterwards, we return to the sunspot treatments, where we find that sunspots create 
coordination failure.  
 
3.1 Control Treatment 
Before we analyze the potential effects of the sunspot, we would like to know whether 
coordination took place in the absence of the sunspot. Figure 1 summarizes the share of W 
decisions in all treatments without announcements of all sessions (both C/S sessions and 
S/C sessions). 
 











We clearly see that without sunspot announcements coordination was almost perfect. 
Indeed, 98.6% of all 1680 decisions were W and even in the first periods W was chosen in 
95.2% of all cases. In brief, the subjects almost always managed to coordinate on the payoff-
dominant equilibrium.  
 
We take this finding as a confirmation that the subjects understood the game and that our 
game is easy enough so that coordination on the superior equilibrium (W,W,W) occurs right 
from the start if subjects are not influenced by sunspot announcements. In this paper we 
 focus on sunspots as a potential explanation of coordination failure. Therefore, it is crucial, 
that the design is such that there is coordination in the absence of sunspots.  
 
3.2 Sunspot Treatments 
In this section, we analyze the potential effect of the sunspot on the coordination in our 
game. Figure 2 shows the share of W decisions in the treatments in which subjects received 
randomly determined announcements in the first 20 periods (S/C sessions).   
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The difference to the control treatment is striking. In both the session at the University of 
Pompeu Fabra (UPF) and in that at the University of Copenhagen (CPH), a large percentage 
of subjects chose S in each period with a “strike” announcement.. At the UPF session, full 
coordination on (W,W,W) was only achieved in the cases in which there was a “work” 
announcement and never with a “strike” announcement. At the CPH session, when there 
was a “work” announcement, all subjects chose W in only one period and failed to 
coordinate perfectly in the remaining periods.  
 
 Taking both sessions together, the total share of W decisions was 98.1% if the 
announcement was “work” and 77.1% if the announcement was “strike”. As visible in 
Figure 2, the share of W choices was significantly lower in Copenhagen (73.0%) than in 
Barcelona (83.3%) if there was a “strike” announcement (t-test, p<0.001). 
 
Averaging over periods and subjects within subgroups gives us five clearly independent 
observations in both the sunspot and the control treatment4 for the S/C sessions. The 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test applied to these average shares of work decisions confirms that 
there is a significant difference between the two treatments (z=-2.03, p=0.04).  
 
Another way to assess the importance of the sunspot is to estimate the following random 
effects panel probit model for each period t and each subject i (840 observations)  
   P(Yit=1) = (β0 + β1STRIKEit + β2 PERIODt + γGDi), 
where Y = 1 indicates the choice of W, STRIKE equals 1 if the announcement is “strike” 
and 0 otherwise, PERIOD is a time variable, and GD is a collection of dummy variables 
indicating the subgroups with one subgroup at UPF omitted. The time variable serves to 
check for learning effects and the subgroup dummies control for any group-specific effects.   
 
We find5 that the announcement of “strike” reduces the probability of W by 0.098 (p=0.001) 
and that as the experiment goes on, an additional period increases the probability of W by 
0.004 (p=0.008). This means that the strike announcement has a significant effect at the 
individual level, but also that individuals learn to ignore it over time (even if only slowly).  
 
By running different sessions with different order of treatments, we find a significant order 
effect. In the C/S session, in which subjects played the control treatment first and the 
sunspot one next, there is no difference between the treatments (Wilcoxon test, 7 
observations, z=0.78, p=0.43). Thus, the order matters and subjects learn enough from the 
control treatment to avoid any inefficient decision when the sunspot is introduced.  
                                                 
4 Unfortunately, there was an allocation problem of subjects to subgroups in the control group of the 
Copenhagen session, so that we do not want to use two subgroups and are left with 5 instead of 7 independent 
observations. 
5 A likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis of no random effects at p<0.001. Of the six subgroup 
dummy variables, two for CPH and one for UPF are significantly negative.  
  
While the sunspot appears to change the behavior of some subjects, it is not strong enough 
to generate a sunspot equilibrium. We never observe mis-coordination on the inferior (S,S,S) 
Nash equilibrium in any groups, but rather dis-coordination. Thus, in our experiment the 
sunspot does not appear as a coordination device but rather as a source of uncertainty. This 
is not surprising, because strategic uncertainty appears to be very low in the control 
treatment, in which subjects coordinate almost perfectly on the payoff-dominant equilibrium 
right from the start.  
 
3.3 Efficiency 
The dis-coordination caused by the sunspot is quite costly. We measure efficiency by the 
actual payoff per period divided by 40, which is the obtained payoff in the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium (W,W,W). Figure 3 shows us the average levels of efficiency in the treatments in 
which the sunspot matters.  
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 At the UPF session (upper panel), the average level of efficiency is always 1 if the 
announcement is “work”, but only three times above 0.8 if the announcement is “strike”.  
The mean of the level of efficiency in the UPF session with a “strike” announcement is equal 
to 0.728, which is significantly smaller than 1 (t-test, p<0.001).  
 
At the Copenhagen session (lower panel), losses are even greater. Here the average level of 
efficiency is always below 0.8 if the announcement is “strike” and the mean of the average 
level of efficiency in the 17 periods with “strike” announcements is equal to 0.61, which is 
significantly smaller than the average efficiency of 0.896 in the three “work” periods (t-test, 
p<0.001).   
 
Overall, efficiency is significantly reduced when the sunspot is introduced in the first periods 
compared to periods where it is absent (0.714 vs. 0.901, t-test, p<0.001).  We conclude that 
the sunspot is relevant, as it can produce significant economic losses through dis-
coordination when subjects have not learned enough about the game,. 
 
4. Conclusion 
We have demonstrated that a purely random signal unrelated to the fundamentals of the 
game – a sunspot – produces coordination failure (and efficiency losses) among individuals 
who almost perfectly coordinate themselves otherwise. This is especially remarkable because 
our coordination game is so simple. With only two Nash equilibria in pure strategies and 
with the payoff-dominant equilibrium also being risk-dominant, coordination on this 
superior equilibrium is made very easy, as  confirmed by our control treatments. Yet the 
introduction of a – in terms of fundamentals –  irrelevant signal has huge impact on 
behavior. 
Our study is the second paper that shows the relevance of sunspots in a laboratory 
experiment. In contrast to the results in Duffy and Fisher (2005), the sunspots in our 
experiment do not facilitate coordination, but lead to dis-coordination. Furthermore, we 
introduce sunspots in a setting with Pareto ranked equilibria. In this study, rather than 
serving as a coordination device and reducing strategic uncertainty, the sunspot generates it 
and leads to coordination failure. This is a new potential impact of sunspots which has not 
been extensively discussed in the theoretical literature before. Thus, this study is consistent 
 with the view that real life coordination failures can be caused by random, exogenous signals 
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S/C Session Instructions: (announcements in the first 20 periods) 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Your points and thus your payment at the end of 
this experiment depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. Moreover, 
you will receive a show-up fee of 3 Euros. The amount you earn (that depends on the total 
points you receive) will be paid in cash immediately after the experiment is finished. It is very 
important that you read these instructions with care. From now on, you are not allowed to talk 
or communicate in any way with the other participants. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand and one of the experimenters will answer them in private. Please do not ask your 
questions aloud. 
 
This experiment consists of 40 rounds. The experiment will be divided into two sections of 20 
rounds. When the first 20 rounds finish, you will receive the instructions for rounds 21 to 40. At 
the beginning of each round you will be randomly paired with two other participants to form a 
group of three. Hence, the members of your group will be different in each round. The 
members of a group are not necessarily sitting side by side. All groups in the experiment consist 
of three people. 
Your Decision 
In each round, you and the other members of your group will decide whether to “WORK” or 
“STRIKE”.  
Announcement 
Once you are assigned to a group for that round, you and the other members of your group 
will receive an announcement at the beginning of each period. The announcement will be 
either “WORK” or “STRIKE”, and it will be the same for all the participants in this 
experiment, hence for all the members of your group.  
 
It is important that you understand that these announcements are random since they are 
determined by the throw of a dice. The experimenter will throw the dice in front of all the 
participants and will ask one of the participants to announce the number on the dice.  
 
You will receive the announcement “WORK” if the dice is 1 and “STRIKE” otherwise.  
Your Payoff 
Your income will be determined by the points you earn according to the payoff below and it will 
based on your decisions and the decisions of the other players in your group. All groups in 
this experiment receive the same payoff table which is explained below.  
 
     Other Players’ decisions in Your Group 
 
If  BOTH of the 
other participants 
choose WORK 
If ONE of the other 
participants chooses 
WORK and the other 
chooses STRIKE 
If BOTH of the 
other participants 
choose STRIKE 
WORK 40 10 10 




In this table, rows indicate your decision of “WORK” or “STRIKE”, and columns show the 
decisions of the other players. Each cell indicates the points you will receive depending on your 
decision and the decisions of the others in your group. For example, if you choose “WORK”; 
and if both of the other members of your group choose “STRIKE” you receive 10; whereas, if 
you choose “WORK”, and if both of the other players choose “WORK”, you receive 40. If you 
have any questions please raise your hand. 
 
Information at Each Round 
After you make your decision, you will be informed about your current decision, the current 
decisions of your group members and your points from that round. Moreover, in each round, 
you can see the information from previous periods (your decisions, the announcement, the 
decisions of the others and your points). Please remember that you are randomly matched 
with different group members at the beginning of each period. 
 
Each row will give information about each round. The announcement given in that period will 
be in the second column. Your previous decisions will be in the third column and your previous 
points from previous rounds will be in the last column. Column 4 will display the previous 
decisions of the other members of your group. The screen you will see in each round will be 
similar to one of the following: 
 
ROUND Announcement Your decision 
Decisions of the other 
players in your group 
Your points 
In Round 
…. …. …. …. …. 
 
Payment 
The total amount of points you collect after each round will be summed up to determine your 
total points at the end of the experiment. This final sum will be converted into Euros and will be 
paid out in cash immediately after the experiment is finished. For each 150 points you earn, you 
will receive 1 Euro. Moreover, as it is mentioned at the beginning of the experiment, you will 
receive a show-up fee of 3 Euros. The payment will be made individually and anonymous. 
 
ROUNDS 21-406 
Your decisions and your payoffs are the same for these rounds. The points that you will receive 
are determined according to the same payoff table (p.1). However, once you are assigned to a 
group for that round, you and the other members of your group will receive an 
announcement at the beginning of each period. The announcement will be either “WORK” 
or “STRIKE”, and it will be the same for all the participants in this experiment, hence for all the 
members of your group.  
 
                                                 
6 The instructions for this part were given to the subjects as a separate sheet in the second part of the 
experiment.  
 It is important that you understand that these announcements are random since they are 
determined by the throw of a dice. The experimenter will throw the dice in front of all the 
participants and will ask one of the participants to announce the number on the dice.  
 
You will receive the announcement “WORK” if the dice is 1 and “STRIKE” otherwise.  
Information at Each Round 
As before, after you make your decision, you will be informed about your current decision, the 
current decisions of your group members and your points from that round. Moreover, in each 
round, you can see the information from previous periods (your decisions, the announcement, 
the decisions of the others and your points). Please remember again that you are randomly 
matched with different group members at the beginning of each period. 
 
As before, each row will give information about each round. The announcement given in that 
period will be in the second column. Your previous decisions will be in the third column and 
your previous points from previous rounds will be in the last column. Column 4 will display the 
previous decisions of the other members of your group. The screen you will see in each round 
will be similar to one of the following: 
 
ROUND Announcement Your decision 
Decisions of the other 
players in your group 
Your points 
In Round 
…. …. …. …. …. 
Payment 
The total amount of points you collect after each round will be summed up to determine your 
total points at the end of the experiment. This final sum will be converted into Euros and will be 
paid out in cash immediately after the experiment is finished. For each 150 points you earn, you 
will receive 1 Euro. Moreover, as it is mentioned at the beginning of the experiment, you will 
receive a show-up fee of 3 Euros. The payment will be made individually and anonymous. 
 
 C/S Session Instructions (announcements in the last 20 periods) 
 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Your points and thus your payment at the end of 
this experiment depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. Moreover, 
you will receive a show-up fee of 3 Euros. The amount you earn (that depends on the total 
points you receive) will be paid in cash immediately after the experiment is finished. It is very 
important that you read these instructions with care. From now on, you are not allowed to talk 
or communicate in any way with the other participants. If you have any questions, please raise 
your hand and one of the experimenters will answer them in private. Please do not ask your 
questions aloud. 
 
This experiment consists of 40 rounds. The experiment will be divided into two sections of 20 
rounds. When the first 20 rounds finish, you will receive the instructions for rounds 21 to 40. At 
the beginning of each round you will be randomly paired with two other participants to form a 
group of three. Hence, the members of your group will be different in each round. The 
members of a group are not necessarily sitting side by side. All groups in the experiment consist 
of three people. 
Your Decision 
In each round, you and the other members of your group will decide whether to “WORK” or 
“STRIKE”.  
Your Payoff 
Your income will be determined by the points you earn according to the payoff below and it will 
based on your decisions and the decisions of the other players in your group. All groups in 
this experiment receive the same payoff table which is explained below.  
 
     Other Players’ decisions in Your Group 
 
If  BOTH of the 
other participants 
choose WORK 
If ONE of the other 
participants chooses 
WORK and the other 
chooses STRIKE 
If BOTH of the 
other participants 
choose STRIKE 
WORK 40 10 10 
STRIKE 0 20 20 
 
In this table, rows indicate your decision of “WORK” or “STRIKE”, and columns show the 
decisions of the other players. Each cell indicates the points you will receive depending on your 
decision and the decisions of the others in your group. For example, if you choose “WORK”; 
and if both of the other members of your group choose “STRIKE” you receive 10; whereas, if 
you choose “WORK”, and if both of the other players choose “WORK”, you receive 40. If you 
have any questions please raise your hand. 
Information at Each Round 
After you make your decision, you will be informed about your current decision, the current 
decisions of your group members and your points from that round. Moreover, in each round, 
you can see the information from previous periods (your decisions, the decisions of the others 
and your points). Please remember that you are randomly matched with different group 




 Each row will give information about each round. Your previous decisions will be in the second 
column and your previous points from previous rounds will be in the last column. Column 3 will 
display the previous decisions of the other members of your group. The screen you will see in 
each round will be similar to one of the following: 
 
ROUND Your decision 
Decisions of the other 
players in your group 
Your points 
In Round 
…. …. …. …. 
Payment 
The total amount of points you collect after each round will be summed up to determine your 
total points at the end of the experiment. This final sum will be converted into Euros and will be 
paid out in cash immediately after the experiment is finished. For each 150 points you earn, you 
will receive 1 Euro. Moreover, as it is mentioned at the beginning of the experiment, you will 




Your decisions and your payoffs are the same for these rounds. The points that you will receive 
are determined according to the same payoff table (p.1). However, once you are assigned to a 
group for that round, you and the other members of your group will receive an 
announcement at the beginning of each period. The announcement will be either “WORK” 
or “STRIKE”, and it will be the same for all the participants in this experiment, hence for all the 
members of your group.  
 
It is important that you understand that these announcements are random since they are 
determined by the throw of a dice. The experimenter will throw the dice in front of all the 
participants and will ask one of the participants to announce the number on the dice.  
 
You will receive the announcement “WORK” if the dice is 1 and “STRIKE” otherwise.  
Information at Each Round 
As before, after you make your decision, you will be informed about your current decision, the 
current decisions of your group members and your points from that round. Moreover, in each 
round, you can see the information from previous periods (your decisions, the announcement, 
the decisions of the others and your points). Please remember again that you are randomly 
matched with different group members at the beginning of each period. 
 
As before, each row will give information about each round. The announcement given in that 
period will be in the second column. Your previous decisions will be in the third column and 
your previous points from previous rounds will be in the last column. Column 4 will display the 
previous decisions of the other members of your group. The screen you will see in each round 
will be similar to one of the following: 
 
ROUND Announcement Your decision 
Decisions of the other 
players in your group 
Your points 
In Round 
…. …. …. …. …. 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
 Control Questions for the C/S sessions:8 
1) In all the rounds are you in a group with the same people? 
2) What is your payoff, if you choose "work", and if one of the other members chooses "work" 
and the other chooses "strike"? 
3) What is your payoff, if you choose "strike", and if one of the other members chooses "work" 
and the other chooses "strike"? 
4) Will you always receive the same announcement?   
5) Is the announcement you receive determined randomly? 
6) In the rounds 21 to 40, did the payoff table that you are using change? 
 
Questionnaire for the C/S sessions:9 
1) First of all we would like to get some statistical information 
1. Studies 
2. Years of study 
3. Age 
4. Sex 
2) Please answer the following questions: 
1. The experiment was boring/interesting:  1 2 3 4 5  
2. The experiment was too short/too long: 1 2 3 4 5 
3. Would you like to participate in more experiments? 
4. Did you take any class on game theory? 
3) Please briefly explain your decisions of “work” or “strike” in the first part. 
4) Please briefly explain your decisions of “work” or “strike” in the second part. 
5) Did the announcements in the second part affect your decisions? 
6) What was more important for your decisions? 
1. Gaining more points 
2. Maintaining a safe payment 
3. They were both equally important for me 
7) Did the previous decisions of the other participants affect your decisions? 
8) Do you have further comments? 
 
The experiment is finished  
 
Thank you participating  
 
                                                 
8 The control questions for the S/C sessions are the same as the C/S sessions; however, the order of questions 
is different. 
9 The questionnaire for the S/C sessions are the same as the C/S sessions except for question 5. The question 5 
for S/C sessions referred to the announcement in the “first” part. 
